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Attention determines which cues receive processing and are learnt about. Learning, however, 
leads to attentional biases. In the study of animal learning, in some circumstances, cues that 
have previously been predictive of their consequences are subsequently learnt about more 
than nonpredictive cues, suggesting that they receive more attention. In other circumstances, 
cues that have previously led to uncertain consequences are learnt about more than predictive 
cues. In human learning there is a clear role for predictiveness, but a role for uncertainty has 
been less clear. Here we show, in a human learning task that cues that led to uncertain 
outcomes were subsequently learnt about more than cues that were previously predictive of 
their outcomes. This effect occurred when there were few uncertain cues. When the number 
of uncertain cues was increased, attention switched to predictive cues. This pattern of results 
was found for cues that were uncertain by virtue of leading to two different outcomes equally 
often in a non-predictable manner, and for cues used in a nonlinear discrimination that were 
not predictive individually, but that were predictive in combination with other cues. This 
suggests that the opposing predictiveness and uncertainty effects were both determined by the 
relationship between individual cues and outcomes rather than the predictive strength of 
combined cues. These results demonstrate that learning affects attention, but the precise 
nature of the effect on attention depends on the level of task complexity potentially reflecting 






There is a reciprocal relationship between attention and learning. Attention determines which 
cues are selected for processing and are learnt about. Learning, however, subsequently 
influences attention. Therefore, it is important that the theoretical analyses of both attention 
and learning account for the interplay between the two processes. From the field of 
associative learning in animals, it has been found, depending on the procedure, that learning 
can have different, opposing effects on attention. One effect is the ‘predictiveness effect’ in 
which cues that are better predictors of outcomes than other cues (e.g., a noise signalling food 
in a Pavlovian conditioning procedure is a better predictor than the incidental contextual 
cues) gain attention (Mackintosh, 1975). The other effect is that of ‘uncertainty’ in which 
cues that are uncertain by virtue of either being novel or leading to a number of outcomes 
(e.g., food or no food) in a variable manner receive a high level of attention compared to cues 
for which the outcomes are certain (e.g., a cue that always leads to food) (Pearce & Hall, 
1980). The effects are opposite effects. A predictive cue is a cue that correlates with a 
particular outcome and, therefore, there is some certainty associated with consequences of the 
cue. An uncertain cue is a cue that is nonpredictive or less predictive than other cues either 
due to being novel and its consequence unknown or because its presentation does not 
correlate reliably with an outcome. The outcome may be present on some occasions but not 
others or the cue may lead to different outcomes or different quantities of an outcome in a 
random manner.  
 
Both the predictiveness and uncertainty effects may reflect potential heuristics for efficient 
information processing given that attention is a limited resource. The predictiveness effect 
results in increased attention to stimuli that are relevant for a particular task and decreased 
attention to stimuli that are irrelevant or redundant. The uncertainty effect results in attention 
being reduced for cues that have already been learnt such that attentional resources can be 
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maximised for cues whose consequences are unknown. The difference between the two 
effects has been suggested to potentially reflect the difference between exploration and 
exploitation of cues for achieving optimality (Beesley, Nguyen, Pearson, & Le Pelley, 2015). 
The trade-off between devoting attention to predictive cues and using attention to reduce 
uncertainty occurs in any form of categorisation task. For example, an experienced 
radiologist will be efficient at diagnosis by paying attention to features of images that are 
good predictors of pathology and ignoring features that are not relevant for diagnosis 
(utilising predictiveness). However, attention must also be paid to features of images that 
have uncertain diagnostic properties in order to avoid misdiagnosis (utilising uncertainty). 
 
The fact that learning influences attention means that information processing is biased by 
previous experience. While this may lead to more efficient information processing, it may 
also lead to biases in learning and behaviour that do not necessarily reflect the true statistical 
properties of experienced events. For example, the formation of stereotypes of social groups 
can be the result of differences in the previous degree of predictiveness of social group 
characteristics for evaluatively neutral information (Le Pelley et al., 2010; Spiers, Love, Le 
Pelley, Gibb, & Murphy, 2017). This suggests that the attentional biases that occur as a 
consequence of learning are likely to have a profound effect on many aspects of cognition 
such as beliefs, attitudes and decision making. Furthermore, an impaired ability to acquire 
attentional biases as a consequence of learning may lead to abnormal cognitive processes. 
Attentional deficits in neuropsychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia have been proposed 
to reflect a failure to reduce attention to irrelevant, nonpredictive cues (Haselgrove et al., 
2016; Le Pelley, Schmidt-Hansen, Harris, Lunter, & Morris, 2010). Failure to reduce 
attention to irrelevant cues correlates with the positive symptoms of schizophrenia suggesting 
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that delusions and hallucinations may be a consequence of abnormal information processing 
(Kapur, 2003; Morris, Griffiths, Le Pelley, & Weickert, 2013).  
 
In the field of associative learning in animals, two theories have been developed to account 
for predictiveness and uncertainty: the predictiveness effect is accounted for by Mackintosh 
(1975) and the uncertainty effect is accounted for by Pearce and Hall (1980). While these 
theories make some opposing predictions, they describe different mechanisms for the effect 
of learning on attention. Therefore, it is possible that they account for separate, dissociable 
processes. Indeed, hybrid models that combine the predictiveness and uncertainty 
mechanisms have been developed in order to capture this notion (Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & 
Mackintosh, 2010).  
 
Theories of attention in associative learning 
Both the theories of Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce and Hall (1980) propose that the salience 
of a cue is changed as a consequence of prediction error. Prediction error occurs when the 
outcome of a cue is not expected. The strength of an association between a cue and an 
outcome represents the extent to which a cue predicts the outcome. As associative strength 
increases prediction error decreases and learning ceases when the outcome is fully predicted. 
While prediction error can be large for unexpected outcomes (e.g., at the start of training of a 
cue-outcome association), it can also be large when a fully expected outcome is omitted. The 
Mackintosh model proposes that on a given trial, the salience of the cue that is the best 
predictor of the outcome increases and the salience of other cues that are present decrease. 
Therefore, prediction error is calculated for each cue, independent of the associative strength 
of the cues present, and the cue with the smallest prediction error gains attention. Changes in 
associative strength for individual cues on a trial are calculated by the following equation:  
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Equation 1: 
VA = A··( – VA) 
Prediction error is represented by the discrepancy between the current associative strength of 
cue A (VA) and the maximum associative strength that can be supported by the outcome (). 
The salience of the outcome () and the salience of cue A (A) determine the rate at which 
the current prediction error drives changes in learning on a given trial. Changes in A on a 
given trial are governed by the following rule: 
 
Equation 2:  
A > 0 if | – VA| < | – VX| 
A < 0 if | – VA|  | – VX| 
The prediction error for cue A ( – VA) is compared to the prediction error for all the other 
cues present on a trial ( – VX). If the error is smaller for cue A than all the other cues then 
A increases but if it is the same or greater then it decreases. The consequences of these rules 
for changes in associability are clear when considering a situation in which two cues with 
different initial values of  are conditioned in compound (e.g., AB; see Figure 1). If we 
assume that  is higher for cue A than cue B then because the initial increase in associative 
strength on trial 1 will be higher for A than B, A will be a better predictor of the outcome 
than B. This results in  increasing for cue A and decreasing for B. The difference in 
associative strength between the cues drives the difference in  further over training and the 




The Pearce-Hall model, in contrast to the Mackintosh model, does not assume that changes in 
attention to a cue are governed by the individual prediction error for that cue, but the summed 
error for all cues present on a trial. The following equation determines changes in associative 
strength on a given trial: 
Equation 3: 
VA = A·S·  
S and  are determined by the intensity of the cue and the outcome, respectively. Here,  
reflects specifically the associability of the cue: how readily the cue is able to form 
associations with other stimuli.  changes with experience determined by the extent of 
prediction according to the following equation: 
Equation 4: 
n =  – Vn–1 
Prediction error is calculated as the discrepancy between  (the maximum associative 
strength supported by the US) and the combined associative strength of all the stimuli present 
on a trial (V). Therefore, in contrast to the Mackintosh model that calculates prediction error 
for each cue (individual error term), the Pearce-Hall model assumes that prediction error is 
determined by the additive strength of all cues (summed error term). The associability of a 
cue on a given trial (n) is determined by the size of prediction error on the preceding trial (n–
1). As prediction error decreases (i.e., as learning occurs),  decreases. Importantly, alpha is 
determined by the size of prediction error regardless of whether it is positive (due to the 
surprising presence of an outcome) or negative (due to the surprising absence of an outcome). 
Therefore, partial reinforcement, in which a cue is sometimes paired with an outcome and 
sometimes not, leads to alpha remaining high over training. This scenario is modelled in 
Figure 2. Cues A and B were paired with reinforcement on separate trials, but cue A was 
reinforced on every trial and cue B was reinforced on 50% of trials. While the associative 
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strength of cue A is higher than for cue B, the alpha for cue A reduces in comparison to B 
over training in line with decreases in the size of prediction error. Alpha for B remains high 
over training. 
 
While both models assume that the initial level of alpha is determined by the salience of a cue 
and the amount of attention that it receives, the Mackintosh model and Pearce-Hall model 
propose that changes in alpha specifically determine how readily a cue will be learnt (i.e., a 
cue’s associability). Therefore, the experiments that have been used as support for either the 
Mackintosh (1975) or Pearce and Hall (1980) models have assessed changes in attention by 
measuring how rapidly new learning is acquired with the cues (e.g., Hall & Pearce, 1979; 
Mackintosh & Little, 1969). This is done by pairing the previously experienced cues with 
new outcomes and measuring the extent of learning of the new cue-outcome associations. 
While the two theories make opposing predictions, due to the wealth of evidence for both 
accounts, the results may be reconciled by assuming that individual prediction error and 
summed prediction error separately lead to predictiveness and uncertainty effects and under 
particular conditions one effect may outweigh the other (Haselgrove, Esber, Pearce, & Jones, 
2010; Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010).  
 
By describing potential mechanisms for the interaction between learning and attention the 
Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce-Hall (1980) theories have been able to provide accounts for a 
wide range of phenomena. The original impetus for the theories was to account for selective 
learning effects, often referred to as cue competition effects, such as blocking (Arcediano, 
Matute, & Miller, 1997; Kamin, 1969)  and overshadowing (Pavlov, 1927; Prados, 2011) in 
which animals and humans learn about some cues but not others. In addition they provide 
accounts of the effect of latent inhibition in which pre-exposure to a cue retards acquisition of 
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learning (Lubow & Moore, 1959), a procedure widely used as a test of selective attention in 
the assessment of the cognitive impairments in psychopathology (Lubow, 1997). The 
Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce-Hall (1980) theories provide alternative accounts of these 
phenomena, but while the two theories make similar predictions for some effects, such as cue 
competition (e.g., they both predict that a blocked cue suffers from a reduction in attention), 
they each have individual successes in other situations reaffirming the idea that they describe 
distinct processes. For example, the predictiveness effect has been used to explain the 
paradoxical, inverse base rate effect  in categorisation learning (Kruschke, 2001) in which a 
compound of stimuli for which the individual stimuli have previously been associated with 
different categories is attributed as belonging to a rare, less frequently experienced category 
rather than a more common category (Medin & Edelson, 1988). Recently, the role of 
uncertainty, as described by the Pearce-Hall (1980) model has been applied to the analysis of 
the circumstances that produce habitual and goal-directed responding (Bouton, Broomer, 
Rey, & Thrailkill, 2020; Thrailkill, Trask, Vidal, Alcala, & Bouton, 2018). There is also 
evidence that the processes underlying predictiveness and uncertainty effects reflect 
dissociable neural substrates (Nasser, Calu, Schoenbaum, & Sharpe, 2017). Neural signals in 
the basolateral amygdala mimic the course of prediction errors in learning as determined by 
the Pearce-Hall (1980) model (Esber et al., 2012; Roesch, Calu, Esber, & Schoenbaum, 2010; 
Roesch, Esber, Li, Daw, & Schoenbaum, 2012). Increases in associability that occur as 
consequence of uncertainty require the amygdala (Holland & Gallagher, 1993), whereas 
decrements in associability depend on the hippocampus (Han, Gallagher, & Holland, 1995). 
In contrast, changes in associability that depend on predictiveness require the prelimbic 
region of the medial prefrontal cortex (Sharpe & Killcross, 2014, 2015).  
 
The role of predictiveness and uncertainty in human associative learning 
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In human associative learning, a role for predictiveness in determining attention has also been 
found (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003), but a role for uncertainty has received less support. 
Similar to the animal literature, changes in attention as a consequence of learning have been 
assessed by measuring the extent of new learning with cues. In a recent review Le Pelley, 
Mitchell, Beesley, George, and Wills (2016) cite 18 papers demonstrating that such 
procedures reveal an effect of predictiveness on attention. In contrast, a role for uncertainty, 
as measured by associability (how rapidly a cue is learnt about), is less clear. Griffiths, 
Johnson, and Mitchell (2011) showed that prior learning of a predictive relationship between 
a cue and a moderate outcome reduced the ability of the cue to become predictive of a larger 
outcome compared to a cue whose consequences were uncertain due to receiving a number of 
extinction trials in which the moderate outcome was not presented. A similar study, however, 
failed to find support for a role of uncertainty in attention (Packer, Siddle, & Tipp, 1989). 
Furthermore, Le Pelley, et al. (2016) state that unpublished attempts to replicate the findings 
of Griffiths, et al. (2011) have not been successful. Recently, however, Easdale, Le Pelley, 
and Beesley (2017) have shown that sudden switches in the level of uncertainty may increase 
associability.  
 
Rather than measuring changes in associability, some studies have examined the effect of 
uncertainty on overt attention, as measured by eye gaze. Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown, 
and Duka (2008) found that participants showed greater fixation of eye gaze for a cue that 
was uncertain cue due to leading to an outcome (an auditory stimulus) on only 50% trial 
compared to a cue that was predictive due to learning to the outcome on 100% of trials. This 
effect, however, is not always replicated (Austin & Duka, 2010). Beesley, et al. (2015) found 
that participants spend a greater proportion of time fixating on uncertain cues within a trial 
than on predictive cues. There was not, however, any advantage of uncertain cues over 
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predictive cues in a subsequent test of associability. Indeed, in the test of associability, the 
opposite was found, with previously predictive cues learnt about more than previously 
uncertain cues. This has led to the suggestion that uncertainty may affect levels of attention to 
all cues generally, rather than leading to stimulus-specific changes in attention and 
associability (Beesley, et al., 2015; Le Pelley, et al., 2016). 
 
The lack of behavioural evidence for a role of uncertainty in attention in human associative 
learning is at odds with research demonstrating neural correlates of uncertainty in the human 
brain. For example, Li, Schiller, Schoenbaum, Phelps, and Daw (2011) found that patterns of 
activity to cues were sensitive to the absolute prediction error associated with the cue (i.e., 
the discrepancy between the outcome and the anticipation of the outcome, independent of 
whether the discrepancy was positive or negative). This neural correlate of unsigned 
prediction error mimics the calculation of error for determining uncertainty as described by 
Pearce and Hall (1980). It is possible that the behavioural procedures used to date have not 
been sensitive enough to detect an effect of uncertainty. Alternatively, the lack of behavioural 
evidence for uncertainty may suggest that although uncertainty is encoded at some level, it 
does not impact on attention. If this is the case it would suggest a divergence between 
humans and nonhuman animals in the learning mechanisms that affect attention. 
 
In the present study, we report a series of experiments that demonstrate that non-predictive, 
uncertain cues do receive more attention than predictive cues, under particular conditions, as 
measured by the extent to which the cues can enter into associations with new outcomes, in a 
human learning procedure. We examined changes in associability (the learning rate 
parameter for a cue) rather than more explicit measures of attention such as eye gaze due to 
the assumptions of the Mackintosh (1975) and Pearce and Hall (1980) models that alpha 
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determines learning rate. Our starting point for this line of work was an experiment 
(Experiment 1) that was similar in design to an experiment reported by Livesey, Thorwart, 
De Fina, and Harris (2011), in which cues that were irrelevant in a discrimination learning 
procedure, by virtue of being non-predictive and presented simultaneously with predictive 
cues, were compared to cues that were non-predictive, but were not presented simultaneously 
with predictive cues (uncertain cues; Experiment 1). Our design was somewhat simpler than 
that used by Livesey, et al. (2011) and we were interested in establishing the conditions under 
which changes in associability occur. Thus, task difficulty and complexity of the design of 
the task have been suggested as factors that may influence whether an uncertainty effect is 
observed (Le Pelley, et al., 2016). In contrast to Livesey et al., who failed to find a difference 
between the two types of cues, we found that the irrelevant cues had lower associability than 
the uncertain cues. There are a number of potential explanations for this result, but the results 
of Experiments 2a and 2b demonstrated that the results of Experiment 1 reflected, at least in 
part, that uncertain cues increase in associability relative to other cues. Those results also 
contradicted the results of Livesey et al., who found the opposite effect: predictive cues were 
learnt about more readily than uncertain cues. The subsequent experiments were devoted to 
identifying the key differences between our procedures and those used by Livesey et al. that 
determine whether predictiveness or uncertainty has the greatest effect on attention paid to a 
cue. Experiment 3 was a replication of the procedure used by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003) 
in order to determine whether we could replicate the predictiveness effect that they found 
using the stimuli that were used in Experiments 1 and 2a that produced the uncertainty effect. 
Experiment 4a and 4b used a more complex training procedure that involved a greater 
number of uncertain cues, which was similar to the procedure used by Livesey, et al. (2011). 
In those experiments we found an effect of predictiveness rather than uncertainty. Experiment 
5 replicated the procedures used in Experiment 2a and 2b (that produced an uncertainty 
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effect) and Experiment 4b (that produced a predictiveness effect) with participants being 
assigned to one or the other procedure. Experiment 6 examined whether an increase in the 
number of cues was sufficient to result in a predictiveness effect. Finally, Experiments 7, 8a 
and 8b examined whether the number of uncertain cues affected attention to cues that are 
both uncertain and relevant for discrimination learning by virtue of being part of a 
biconditional discrimination in which no one cue is informative, only the unique 
configurations of cues. This allowed assessment of the role of individual prediction error (for 
each cue, independent of other cues) and summed prediction error (across all cues present on 






Experiment 1  
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to assess whether uncertainty, as determined by the 
summed associative strength of a compound of stimuli, affects the associability of cues. The 
design of Experiment 1 is shown in Table 1. In stage 1 participants received trials with cues 
that were not predictive of outcomes by virtue of being paired equally often with two 
outcomes (1 and 2) across trials. Some of these non-predictive cues were presented in 
compound with cues that were predictive across trials. Thus, cues V-Y were non-predictive, 
but were presented in compound with cues A-D, which were predictive. For example, cue V 
led to outcome 1 when presented in compound with A, but led to outcome 2 when presented 
in compound with B. In contrast, cue A led to outcome 1 regardless of the other cue in the 
compound (i.e., AV or AW). In order to differentiate between cues, we will refer to the non-
predictive cues V-Y as irrelevant cues. Other non-predictive cues were presented in 
compounds with cues that were also equally non-predictive. Thus, cues P-S were presented in 
the compounds PQ, RS, PS and QR, and these compounds were paired with outcomes 1 and 
2 equally often. We will refer to these non-predictive cues as uncertain cues.  
 
Although the uncertain and irrelevant cues have the same statistical relationship with 
outcomes 1 and 2, the compounds in which they are presented differ in terms of their 
summed prediction error. The summed error reflects the discrepancy between the outcome 
and the combined predictive strength of all the cues present on a trial. The summed error of 
the compounds that consist of two uncertain cues will be high due to both cues being 
nonpredictive of the outcome. The summed error of the compounds that include the irrelevant 
cues will be lower, however, due to the presence of the predictive cues. Thus, as the 
associative strength of the predictive cue increases over the training, the summed error of the 
compound decreases. This is an important distinction given the assumptions of the Pearce-
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Hall model (1980), which predicts that increases in attention to nonpredictive cues are driven 
by the summed error term rather than the individual error of cues. Therefore, the Pearce-Hall 
model anticipates that uncertain cues should receive more attention than irrelevant cues. 
 
In order to assess whether uncertain cues gained more attention than irrelevant cues the 
associability of the stimuli was assessed in a second stage of training (see Table 1). 
Participants were presented with compounds consisting of one irrelevant cue and one 
uncertain cue. These new compounds were paired with new outcomes; either outcome 3 or 4. 
Therefore, the irrelevant cues and uncertain cues were now equally predictive of these new 
outcomes. In the test phase participants were presented with novel compounds that consisted 
of either two irrelevant cues or two uncertain cues that had each led to the same outcome in 
stage 2. Participants were asked to rate how likely outcome 3 or 4 was given a particular 
compound. Greater attention to one type of cue over another would be indicated by more 




Participants: Twenty-four (10 females, 14 males) people participated in Experiment 1. The 
age range was 18-38 (mean: 25.36, SD: 4.26). All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision. Durham University Psychology undergraduates received participant pool 
credit and others were compensated for their time at a rate of £10/hour. All procedures were 
approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Sub-Committee (15-10), Durham 
University. 
 The sample sizes across all experiments (except Experiment 3, see methods) ranged 
from 21-32 (Experiment 5 used a between-subjects procedure with N = 24 per group). 
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Variation between experiments reflected the number of participants that were available for 
testing within a particular time frame. For each experiment or between-subjects condition 
within an experiment, we aimed to test in excess of 20 participants similar to the study by 
Livesey, et al. (2011) that used sample sizes of between 23-31 participants. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli: All experimental stimuli were presented on a standard desktop 
computer with a 19-inch CRT monitor. Presentation of stimuli was controlled by MATLAB 
with CRS (Cambridge Research System) toolbox and psychtoolbox. The distance between 
participants and CRT monitor was 45 cm. Flags of the following countries were used as cues: 
United States, Brazil, Canada, China, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Germany, Israel, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, Benin, Guyana, Jamaica, The 
Republic of the Congo, Portugal, Cuba, Panama and Uruguay. Each flag was 10° x 8° (Width 
x Length) in size. The outcomes (1-4) were represented by images depicting an support 
(image of an apple), attack (image of a bomb), retreat (image of man running) and surrender 
(image of a man kneeling). Each outcome image was 4.6° x 4.3° in size. Participants made 
responses by clicking on a mouse. 
 
Procedure: Participants were instructed that they would play the role of a soldier and were 
required to predict which outcome would be correct given the combination of flags presented. 
They were told that they would receive feedback for each choice, such that they could learn 
by trial and error as the procedure progressed. In stage 1, each trial started with the 
presentation of two cues (flags) and two outcomes. Flags were presented in the top left and 
right corners of the screen. Outcomes were presented in the middle of the lower half of the 
screen. One outcome was presented above the other outcome. Participants had to choose to 
either select an upper outcome icon (e.g., bomb) or lower outcome icon (e.g., retreat) by 
 17 
using a left click of the mouse. Immediately after a response was made the word “Correct!” 
or “Incorrect” appeared in the centre of the screen for one second. The next trial started 
immediately after the feedback screen. Participants received trials that belonged to one of two 
different conditions (see Table 1). In the predictive/irrelevant condition, participants were 
presented with pairs of flags. Across trials, individual cues would appear equally often with 
two other flags (e.g., on half the trials in which cue A was presented, it would be presented 
with V and on the other half with W). The unique combination of flags on a particular trial 
always led to the same outcome in stage 1, either outcome 1 or 2. However, across trials, one 
flag in each compound was predictive in that it always led to the same outcome in stage 1, 
independent of which flag it was paired with on a given trial (e.g., A was predictive of 
outcome 1 when presented with other flags: AVO1, AWO1). The other flag in each 
compound was irrelevant in that it was not predictive by virtue of being paired with two 
different outcomes equally often (e.g., V was irrelevant when presented with other flags: 
AVO1, BVO2). Participants received eight trial types in the predictive/irrelevant 
condition: AVO1, AWO1, BVO2, BWO2, CXO2, CYO2, DXO1, DYO2. 
Cues A, B, C and D were predictive and V, W, X and Y were irrelevant. In the uncertain 
condition, participants were presented with pairs of flags that, across trials, led to two 
different outcomes equally often. Similar to the predictive/irrelevant condition, individual 
flags were each presented equally often with two other cues (e.g., PQ and PS), but 
independent of the particular compound that was presented, the probability of a particular 
outcome was 50%. Participants received four trial types in the uncertain condition: 
PQO1/O2, PS O1/O2, RQO1/O2, RSO1/O2. Participants received 192 trials in 
total, with 16 trials of each trial type. The order of trial types across trials was random with 
the constraint that there was an equal number of each trial type every 48 trials. For every trial 
type, the spatial location of individual flags was balanced across every four trials of the same 
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trial type so that each flag equally often occupied the left or right location (e.g. A on the left, 
V on the right; V on the left, A on the right). The spatial location (top or bottom) of outcome 
1 and 2 was random across trials. 
 
In stage 2, participants received eight trial types in which pairs of flags reliably led to either 
outcome 3 or 4. Four of the eight trial types consisted of pairs of flags that included one 
irrelevant cue and one uncertain cue from stage 1 (recombined cues: VPO3, WQO4, 
XRO3, YSO4). For the remaining trial types, new flags that were not previously 
experienced in stage 1 were used (EFO3, GHO4, IJO3, KLO4). These trials with 
new flags were used as filler trials in order to increase the memory load of stage 2, and 
replicated, in part, the procedure used by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003). Participants 
received 64 trials with eight trials of each trial type. The order of trial types across trials was 
random with the constraint that there were an equal number of each trial type every 16 trials. 
All other details were the same as stage 1. 
  
In the test phase, participants were presented with novel pairings of the flags previously 
presented in stage 2. Flags were presented in the top left and right corners of the screen in a 
similar manner to the previous training stages. Participants were asked to rate how likely 
outcome 3 or outcome 4 was given the combination of flags on a scale from 1-9 that ran 
horizontally on the screen, with one outcome at one end of the scale and the other outcome at 
the other end. Participants were instructed that choosing either 1 or 9 would indicate that the 
outcome corresponding to the respective numbers was very likely, whereas the other outcome 
was not. There were eight trial types. Two of the trials types consisted of pairs of flags that 
were previously irrelevant in stage 1. One pair consisted of flags that had both led to outcome 
3 in stage 2 (VX) and the other outcome 4 (WY). Two of trial types consisted of pairs of 
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flags that were previously uncertain in stage 1. One pair consisted of flags that had both led 
to outcome 3 in stage 2 (PR) and the other outcome 4 (QS). The remaining trial types 
consisted of the new flags presented in stage 2. One trial type consisted of flags that led to 
outcome 3 in stage 2 (IJ), and another with flags that led to outcome 4 (KL). The remaining 
trial types consisted of pairs of flags that had led to different outcomes during stage 2 (EH 
and FG). The purpose of the test trials with the filler cues from Stage 2 was to test whether 
participants were able to use the rating scale appropriately and to replicate the procedure used 
by (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). Participants received two test trials with each trial type. 
The spatial location of each flag was balanced such that across trials each flag appeared 
equally often on the left and right. The location of outcome 3 and 4 on the scale was random 
across trials. 
 
The identity of each cue (A-D, P-S and V-Y) was random across participants. The identity of 
outcomes 1-4 (apple, bomb, retreat and surrender) was also random across participants. 
 
Data analysis: The accuracy of responding, as measured by the proportion of correct 
responses for the different conditions was recorded during stage 1 and 2 training. 
Performance was assessed over blocks of trials (the number of trials per block is stated in the 
relevant analyses). In the test stage the ratings were coded such that scores of 1 indicated that 
outcome 3 was very likely and scores of 9 indicated that outcome 4 was very likely. The 
mean score for the two test trials of each trial type was calculated. For all experiments, data 
were analysed using multifactorial ANOVA. Interactions were analysed by simple main 
effects analysis using the pooled error term from the original ANOVA.  
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Analysis of the filler trials was conducted in Stage 2 in order to determine whether these new 
cues were learnt in addition to the recombined cues that were previously presented in Stage 2. 
For the sake of brevity, we have omitted analyses of the test trials with the filler cues but for 
all experiments, performance on the filler cue test trials was as expected with ratings being 
below 5 for IJ and above 5 for KL, indicating that participants that learnt the cue-outcome 
associations. Ratings for EH and FG were close to 5, consistent with the fact that each 
compound included one cue associated with outcome 3 and another with outcome 4.  
 
For all experiments, no exclusion criteria were used and the initial data analysis was carried 
out on all participants. Other studies, such as Livesey, et al. (2011), have used an exclusion 
criterion in order to eliminate participants that did not learn in the first stage of training. In 
order to aid comparison with studies that have employed an exclusion criterion, the number 
of subjects that failed to show performance of 60% and above in the last half of stage 1 
training on the soluble components of the learning task are reported. This criterion was used 
by Livesey, et al. (2011).  In addition, we report in the Supplementary Material statistical 
analyses of the test phase on the subset of participants that met the criterion. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
over blocks for the predictive/irrelevant condition, but no improvement for the uncertain 
condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 84.24% 
(3.42 SEM) correct for the predictive/irrelevant condition and 46.61% (2.19 SEM) for the 
uncertain condition. A repeated measure ANOVA with blocks (1-4) and cue condition 
(predictive/irrelevant vs. uncertain) as factors showed significant main effects of both block 
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(F(3,69) = 12.85, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .36, 90% CI [.19, .46]) and cue condition (F(1,23) = 74.82, 
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .76, 90% CI [.58, .84]) and a significant interaction between factors (F(3,69) 
= 6.21, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = .21, 90% CI [.06, .32]). Two participants failed to show performance 
of 60% and above on the predictive/irrelevant condition in the last half of training. One of 
those participants failed to perform above 50% correct. 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training. Learning was superior for the 
new cues compared to the recombined cues from stage 1.  Mean performance on the last 
block (two trials of each trial type) was 81.25% (4.32 SEM) for the recombined condition and 
92.71% (2.59 SEM) for the novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,69) 
= 35.50, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .61, 90% CI [.47, .68]), and cue condition (F(1,23) = 18.50, p < 
0.001, ηp
2 = .45, 90% CI [.18, .61]), but no significant interaction of factors (F(3,69) = 1.71, p 
= 0.17, ηp
2 = .07, 90% CI [.00, .15]).  
 
Test stage: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 3a. Participants rated the 
likelihood that outcome 3 or outcome 4 would occur on a nine-point scale. Scores below five 
indicated that participants expected outcome 3 and scores above five indicated that 
participants expected outcome 4. The raw ratings on the 1-9 score were analysed. The ratings 
for compounds consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (WYand QS) were higher than for 
those paired with outcome 3 (VX and PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome 
associations. The difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was greater for the 
uncertain condition than the irrelevant condition. A 2 (cue condition: irrelevant cues (VX, 
WY) vs. uncertain cues (PR, QS)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (VX, PR) vs. 4 (WY, QS)) ANOVA was 
conducted. There was a significant main effect of outcome (F(1,23) = 29.11, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
.56, 90% CI [.30, .69]), but no main effect of cue condition (F < 1, p = 0.43). There was an 
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interaction between cue condition and outcome (F(1,23) = 18.96, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .45, 90% 
CI [.18, .61]) demonstrating that the effect of outcome was significantly greater for the 
uncertain cues than for irrelevant cues. Simple main effects analysis of the interaction 
showed that there was a significant effect of outcome for the uncertain cues (F(1,23) = 33.82, 
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .60, 90% CI [.34, .72]) and the irrelevant cues (F(1,23) = 13.88, p = 0.001, 
ηp
2 = .37, 90% CI [.12, .55]). Analysis of the test phase results excluding the participants that 
failed to meet the stage 1 learning criterion showed a similar pattern of results (see 
Supplementary Material, Table S1 and Figure S1a). 
 
Following stage 2 training, participants showed greater learning with the uncertain cues than 
with the irrelevant cues, indicating that, as a result of stage 1 training, associability was 
greater for the uncertain cues than the irrelevant cues. The results are not consistent with 
those reported by Livesey, et al. (2011). They failed to find any difference between irrelevant 
and uncertain cues, and, therefore, concluded that attention was controlled by the individual 
prediction error for each cue rather than the summed error for each compound. Instead, our 
results are consistent with the prediction that uncertain cues receive greater attention than 
irrelevant cues because associability remains high due to the summed error calculated using 
the combined associative strength of both cues. For the irrelevant cues, the summed error per 
trial by the end of training was low for irrelevant cues, by virtue of participants learning 
about the predictive cues. In other words, the uncertain cues were able to benefit from 
increases in associability caused by a Pearce-Hall mechanism to a greater extent than the 
irrelevant cues (Haselgrove, et al., 2010; Pearce & Hall, 1980). This possibility was explored 
in Experiment 2a and 2b. 
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In addition, whilst both our experiment and those of Livesey et al. (2011) tested changes in 
attention for irrelevant and uncertain cues, the procedure used in the current experiment 
differed from that used by Livesey, et al. (2011) in a number of ways, which may have led to 
the difference in the results. The cause of the discrepancy between our findings and those of 
Livesey, et al. (2011) were investigated in Experiments 2b, 4a and 4b. 
 
Experiment 2a and 2b 
In Experiment 1 uncertain cues were learnt about more than irrelevant cues. Irrelevant and 
uncertain cues were matched for individual prediction error because they had the same 
statistical relation with the outcomes. They differed, however, in the level of summed error. 
While the summed error was high for the uncertain cues due to the associative strength of 
both cues in the compound being low, the summed error was low for the irrelevant cues 
because of the high associative strength of the predictive cues. 
 
While it is possible that the results of Experiment 1 demonstrate an effect of uncertainty on 
attention, as determined by the summed error of the compound, there are other differences 
between the conditions (uncertain/irrelevant) which may have contributed to the observed 
difference. One possibility is that, as a specific consequence of the predictive cues, 
participants learnt to ignore the irrelevant cues. This learnt response to the irrelevant cues 
may have then carried over to training in Stage 2 such that participants attended to uncertain 
cues rather than the irrelevant cues. If this was the case, then there is no need to assume that 
the associability of uncertain cues increased as a consequence of stage 1 training. Indeed, it 
would be expected that uncertain cues would receive less attention than predictive cues. 
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The purpose of Experiment 2a was to test whether uncertain cues do, as a consequence of 
stage 1 training, receive more attention than predictive cues. Such evidence, combined with 
the results of Experiment 1, would suggest that uncertain cues undergo an increase in 
associability relative to predictive/irrelevant cues due the summed error of the compound. 
The procedure of Experiment 2a was similar to that for Experiment 1 except that in stage 2 
participants were presented with compounds that consisted of one predictive cue and one 
uncertain cue (see Table 1). In the test phase participants were required to rate how likely 
outcomes 3 or 4 were given compounds that consisted of either predictive cues or uncertain 
cues that had both led to the same outcome in stage 2. 
 
Experiment 2b was a replication of 2a except that the stimuli were the same as those used by 
Livesey, et al. (2011). This was done to rule out the possibility that choice of stimuli and 




Participants: Thirty-two people (24 females, 8 males) participated in Experiment 2a. The age 
range was 18-32 (mean: 23.63, SD: 4.25). Thirty-two participants (20 females, 12 males) 
participated in Experiment 2b. The age range was 20-32 (mean: 25.59, SD: 3.63).  All other 
details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli: For Experiment 2a, all apparatus and stimuli were the same as 
Experiment 1. For Experiment 2b, all details were the same as Experiment 2a except that the 
stimuli used for cues and objects were the same as used by  Livesey, et al. (2011). 
Specifically, the cue images were line drawings of familiar objects taken from the Snodgrass 
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and Vanderwart (1980) standardised set of pictures (4.6° x 4.3 °). The images used for 
outcomes were rain, snow, hail and fog. 
 
Procedure: For Experiment 2a, the procedure for stage 1 of training was the same as 
Experiment 1 (see Table 1). Stage 2 training was similar to Experiment 1 but now 
recombined compounds each consisted of one uncertain flag and one predictive flag 
(APO3, BQO4, CRO3, DSO4). The test stage proceeded in a similar manner to 
Experiment 1. In addition to testing with the novel flags presented in stage 2 (test 
compounds: EH, FG, IJ, KL), participants were tested with pairs of flags that both led to the 
same outcome in stage 2 and were both either uncertain cues (PR, QS) or predictive cues 
(AC, BD) in stage 1. For Experiment 2b, the procedure was the same as Experiment 2a 
except that participants were given instructions similar to those used by Livesey, et al. 
(2011), in which they were told to use the line drawing images in order to predict the weather 




Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
for the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks, but no improvement for the uncertain 
condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 76.56% 
(3.48 SEM) for the predictive/irrelevant condition and 47.27% (2.21 SEM) for the uncertain 
condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,93) = 10.64, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .26, 90% 
CI [.12, .35]) and condition (F(1,31) = 41.48, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .57, 90% CI [.36, .69]) and a 
significant interaction between factors (F(3,93) = 6.34, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = .17, 90% CI [.05, 
.26]). Seven participants failed to show performance of 60% and above on the 
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predictive/irrelevant condition in the last half of training. Four of those participants failed to 
perform above 50% correct. 
 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 81.25% (3.81 SEM) for the recombined condition and 83.20% (3.05 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,93) = 33.67, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .52, 
90% CI [.39, .60]) but no significant main effect of condition (F(1,31) = 2.41, p = 0.13, ηp
2 = 
.07, 90% CI [.00, .24]). There was no significant interaction of factors (F < 1, p = 0.41). 
 
Test stage: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 3b. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was greater for the uncertain condition 
than the predictive condition.  A 2 (predictiveness: predictive cues (AC, BD) vs. uncertain 
cues (PR, QS)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PR) vs. 4 (BD, QS)) ANOVA was conducted. There 
was a significant main effect on outcome (F(1,31) = 21.23, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .41, 90% CI [.18, 
.56]), but no main effect on predictiveness (F < 1, p = 0.42). There was an interaction 
between predictiveness and outcome (F(1,31) = 11.47, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = .27, 90% CI [.07, 
.45]) demonstrating that the effect of outcome was significantly greater for the uncertain cues 
than for predictive cues. Simple main effects analysis of the interaction showed that there was 
a significant effect of outcome for the uncertain cues (F(1,31) = 31.59, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .50, 
90% CI [.28, .64]). The effect for the predictive cues narrowly failed to reach significance 
(F(1,31) = 4.16, p = 0.05, ηp
2 = .12, 90% CI [.00, .30]). Analysis of the test phase results 
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excluding the participants that failed to meet the stage 1 learning criterion showed a similar 
pattern of results (see Supplementary Material, Table S1 and Figure S1b). 
 
 
Experiment 2b  
Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
for the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks, but no improvement for the uncertain 
condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 78.13% 
(3.31 SEM) for the predictive/irrelevant condition and 45.70% (2.20 SEM) for the uncertain 
condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,93) = 6.60, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .18, 90% 
CI [.06, .27]) and condition (F(1,31) = 93.34, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .75, 90% CI [.60, .82]) and a 
significant interaction between factors (F(3,93) = 6.94, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = .18, 90% CI [.06, 
.28]). Eight participants failed to show performance of 60% and above on the 
predictive/irrelevant condition in the last half of training. One of those participants failed to 
perform above 50% correct. 
 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 86.72% (2.69 SEM) for the recombined condition and 86.72% (3.50 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,93) = 41.77, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .57, 
90% CI [.45, .64]), but no significant main effect of condition (F < 1, p = 0.69). There was no 
significant interaction of factors (F(3,93) = 2.19, p = 0.10, ηp
2 = .07, 90% CI [.00, .14]). 
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Test stage: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 3c. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was greater for the uncertain condition 
than the predictive condition.  A 2 (predictiveness: predictive cues (AC, BD) vs. uncertain 
cues (PR, QS)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PR) vs. 4 (BD, QS)) ANOVA was conducted. There 
was a significant main effect on outcome (F(1,31) = 16.22, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .34, 90% CI [.12, 
.51]), but no main effect on predictiveness (F < 1, p = 0.59). The interaction narrowly failed 
to reach significance (F(1,31) = 4.15, p = 0.050, ηp
2 = .12, 90% CI [.00, .30). Simple main 
effects analysis showed that the effect of outcome was significant for both the uncertain 
(F(1,31) = 19.18, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .38, 90% CI [.16, .54]) and predictive cues (F(1,31) = 6.06, 
p = 0.02, ηp
2 = .16, 90% CI [.01, .34]). Analysis of the test phase results excluding the 
participants that failed to meet the stage 1 learning criterion showed a similar pattern of 
results (see Supplementary Material, Table S1 and Figure S1c). 
 
While the interaction between predictiveness and outcome failed to reach the threshold for 
significance (p = 0.05 rather than < 0.05), it was clear that the pattern of results was similar to 
those in Experiment 2a, suggesting that uncertain cues received more attention than 
predictive cues. In order to calculate the strength of evidence for replication of the results of 
Experiment 2a we used the procedure proposed by Ly, Etz, Marsman, and Wagenmakers 
(2019) for calculating a replication Bayes factor: the Bayes factor for the two experiments 
combined as a ratio of the Bayes factor for Experiment 2a. We conducted Bayesian t-tests 
comparing the difference between QS and PR with the difference between BD and AC using 
the JASP software (Love et al., 2019). For Experiment 2a, BF10 = 18.21 and for both 
experiments combined, BF10 = 69.74. Therefore, the replication BF10 = 3.83, suggesting that 
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the evidence for replication of the uncertainty effect was 3.83 times stronger than that for no 
effect of uncertainty. 
 
The results of the test phase for both Experiments 2a and 2b suggest that participants paid 
more attention to uncertain cues than to predictive cues. They rule out the possibility from 
Experiment 1 that the greater attention paid to uncertain cues in that experiment was simply 
the result of participants ignoring irrelevant cues, because the comparison in Experiments 2a 
and 2b was between uncertain cues and predictive cues. These results are in line with the 
predictions of the Pearce-Hall model (1980) in which attention is positively related to size of 
prediction error based on a summed error term. The results contradict the predictions of 
Mackintosh (1975) that proposes that attention is inversely related to prediction error based 
on the individual error term for each cue independent of the associative strength of other 
cues. 
 
Once again, the results do not match those of Livesey, et al. (2011). In that study, it was 
found that uncertain cues received had lower associability than predictive cues. The opposite 
effect was observed in Experiments 2a and an increase in associability of uncertain cues 




Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that uncertain cues had greater associability than both 
irrelevant cues and predictive cues. The results are in contrast to a large number of 
experiments that have demonstrated that non-predictive cues have lower associability than 
predictive cues (Le Pelley, et al., 2016). This finding has been most commonly demonstrated 
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when predictive cues have competed with irrelevant cues for attention (see Le Pelley & 
McLaren, 2003 for a review; Le Pelley, et al., 2016). Given that the results of Experiments 1 
and 2 contradict the findings of other studies it was important to establish that we could 
replicate the finding that predictive cues receive more attention than irrelevant cues using 
procedures similar to Experiments 1 and 2. If this could not be replicated it may suggest that 
there was something specific about the procedures of Experiments 1 and 2 that had led to 
uncertain cues receiving more attention than predictive and irrelevant cues. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3 it was assessed whether predictive cues receive more attention than irrelevant 
cues. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, participants received training with only compounds 
of predictive and irrelevant cues in stage 1 and did not receive training with uncertain 
compounds (see Table 2). This resulted in the procedure being similar to that used by Le 
Pelley and McLaren (2003). 
 
Methods 
Participants: Sixteen people (12 females, 4 males) took part in the experiment. The age range 
was 18-31. All other details were the same as Experiment 1. Based on a power analysis of the 
results of Le Pelley and McLaren (2003), N = 16 was deemed sufficient to achieve power in 
excess of 0.8 (alpha = 0.05). 
 
Apparatus and stimuli: All details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure: In stage 1 participants received training with eight compounds that were 
presented in the same manner as the predictive/irrelevant condition in Experiment 1, in which 
one cue in each compound was predictive over trials, and the other cue was irrelevant by 
virtue of being paired equally often with outcomes 1 and 2 across trials (see Table 2). 
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Participants received no other trial types during stage 1. In contrast to Experiment 1, 
participants received 14 rather 16 presentations of each trial type, matching the stage 1 
training procedure used by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003). All other details were the same as 
Experiment 1.  
 
In stage 2, participants received trials in which the cues from stage 1 were recombined in new 
compounds. These compounds were then paired with either outcome 3 or 4. Each compound 
consisted of one predictive cue from stage 1 and one irrelevant cue from stage 1. Compounds 
AX and CV were paired with outcome 3 and BY and DW were paired with outcome 4. In the 
test stage participants were presented with compounds that consisted of either predictive cues 
(AC, BD) or irrelevant cues (VX, WY). Compounds AC and VX consisted of cues previously 
paired with outcome 3 in stage 2 and compounds BD and WY consisted of cues previously 
paired with outcome 4 in stage 3. All other details for stage 2 and the test phase were the 
same as Experiment 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
over blocks. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial type) was 89.45% 
(3.31 SEM). There was a significant effect of block (F(6,90) = 6.56, p = 0.008, ηp
2 = .30, 
90% CI [.14, .38]). One participant failed to show performance of 60% or above across the 
last three blocks of training (six trials of each trial type). Their performance was 56.25% 
correct. 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Performance on the last block (two trials of each trial type) 
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was 90.63% (4.91 SEM) for the recombined condition and 93.75% (2.28 SEM) for the novel 
condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,45) = 86.23, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .85, 90% 
CI [.77, .88]), but no significant effect of condition (F < 1, p = 0.65) or interaction of factors 
(F(3,45) = 1.10, p = 0.36, ηp
2 = .07, 90% CI [.00, .16]). 
 
Test: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 4. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, WY) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, VX), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was greater for the predictive 
condition than the irrelevant condition.  A 2 (predictiveness: predictive cues (AC, BD) vs. 
irrelevant (VX,WY)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, VX) vs. 4 (BD, WY)) ANOVA was conducted. 
There was a significant main effect on outcome (F(1,15) = 32.08, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .68, 90% 
CI [.38, .79]), but no main effect of predictiveness (F < 1, p = 0.7). There was a significant 
predictiveness by outcome interaction (F(1,15) = 9.45, p = 0.008, ηp
2 = .39, 90% CI [.07, 
.59]), indicating that the effect of outcome was significantly greater for the predictive 
condition (F(1,15) = 22.80, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .60, 90% CI [.28, .74]) than the irrelevant 
condition (F(1,15) = 15.23, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = .50, 90% CI [.17, .67]). Analysis of the test phase 
results excluding the participants that failed to meet the stage 1 learning criterion showed a 




The results of the test stage demonstrate that predictive cues were learnt to a greater extent 
than irrelevant cues in stage 2, replicating the results of other experiments that have used 
similar experimental designs (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). Therefore, it was still 
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possible to demonstrate a role for predictiveness in attention using the same stimuli and cover 
story used in Experiments 1 and 2. This suggests that, because Livesey, et al. (2011) found 
that uncertain cues received less attention than predictive cues, the results of Experiments 2a 





Experiments 4a and 4b 
Other than the nature of the stimuli, Experiment 2a and 2b differed from the experiments 
reported by Livesey, et al. (2011) in the general complexity of the training procedures. In the 
study by Livesey, et al. (2011) participants were exposed to eight uncertain cues across eight 
compounds, resulting in the number of trial types that were impossible to learn being higher 
than in Experiment 2a and 2b, in which there were only four uncertain compounds. 
Therefore, in order to test whether the number of uncertain compounds determined the effects 
of predictiveness and uncertainty the number of uncertain compounds was increased from 
four to eight in Experiments 4a and 4b.  
 
Experiments 4a and 4b were identical except for the combination of stimuli that were used in 
stage 2 and the test phase (see Table 3). In Experiment 4a uncertain cues were combined in 
the test phase in a manner that was similar to that used by Livesey, et al. (2011). In 
Experiment 4b uncertain cues were combined in the test phase in the same manner as that 




Participants: Twenty-four people (15 females, 9 males) participated in Experiment 4a. The 
age range was 18-31 (mean: 22, SD: 3.74). Twenty-six people (24 female, 2 male) 
participated in Experiment 4b. The age rage was 18-28 (mean: 20.6, SD: 3.13). All other 
details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli: For both Experiment 4a and 4b, all details were the same as 
Experiment 2a. 
 
Procedure: The details of stage 1 training were the same for Experiment 4a and 4b (see Table 
3). Stage 1 training was the same as Experiments 2a and 2b except participants now received 
additional training with four extra uncertain compounds (ZM, ZO, NO, NM). These 
compounds were presented in the same manner as the other uncertain compounds (PQ, PS, 
RS, RQ). For Experiment 4a, in stage 2 participants received training that was similar to 
Experiments 2a and 2b except that the recombined compounds were now AP, BR, CZ and 
DN. AP and CZ led to outcome 3 and BR and DN led to outcome 4. The test phase was 
similar to Experiments 2a and 2b except that participants were tested with the compounds 
AC, BD, PZ and NR in addition to the control compounds EH, FG, IJ and KL. Similar to 
Experiments 2a and 2b, compounds AC and BD consisted of predictive cues from stage 1 and 
were paired with outcomes 3 and 4, respectively, in stage 2. Compounds PZ and NR 
consisted of uncertain cues from stage 1 and were paired with outcomes 3 and 4, respectively, 
in stage 2. The details of stage 2 training and the test phase for Experiment 4b were the same 






Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
for the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks, but no improvement for the uncertain 
condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 66.80% 
(3.19 SEM) for the predictive/irrelevant condition and 50.26% (1.87 SEM) for the uncertain 
condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,69) = 8.52, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .27, 90% 
CI [.11, .38]) and condition (F(1,23) = 30.37, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .57, 90% CI [.31, .70]) but no 
significant interaction between factors (F(3,69) = 1.48, p = 0.23, ηp
2 = .06, 90% CI [.00, .14]). 
Seven participants failed to show performance of 60% and above on the predictive/irrelevant 
condition in the last half of training. Three of those participants failed to show performance 
above 50% correct. 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 84.90% (3.28 SEM) for the recombined condition and 88.02% (2.55 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,69) = 26.64, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .54, 
90% CI [.38, .62]) and a significant main effect of condition (F(1,23) = 4.54, p = 0.045, ηp
2 = 
.16, 90% CI [.003, .37]). There was no significant interaction of factors (F(3,69) = 1.21, p = 
0.31, ηp
2 = .05, 90% CI [.00, .12]).  
 
 
Test stage: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 5a. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, NR) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PZ), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was greater for the predictive 
condition than the uncertain condition.   A 2 (predictiveness: predictive cues (AC, BD) vs. 
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uncertain cues (PZ, NR)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PZ) vs. 4 (BD, NR)) ANOVA was 
conducted. There was a significant main effect of  outcome (F(1,23) = 41.53, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
.64, 90% CI [.41, .75]). The effect of predictiveness failed to reach significance (F(1,23) = 
3.62, p = 0.07, ηp
2 = .14, 90% CI [.00, .34]). The interaction between these factors was 
significant (F(1,23) = 13.85, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = .38, 90% CI [.12, .55]) indicating that the effect 
of outcome was significantly greater for the predictive condition than the uncertain condition. 
Simple main effects analysis showed that the effect of outcome was significant for both the 
uncertain (F(1,23) = 12.04, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = .34, 90% CI [.09, .52]) and predictive cues 
(F(1,23) = 46.47, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .67, 90% CI [.44, .77]). Analysis of the test phase results 
excluding the participants that failed to meet the stage 1 learning criterion showed a similar 






Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
for the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks, but no improvement for the uncertain 
condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 71.03% 
(3.63 SEM) for the predictive/irrelevant condition and 47.72% (1.62 SEM) for the uncertain 
condition. There was no significant effect of block (F(3,75) = 2.46, p < 0.07, ηp
2 = .09, 90% 
CI [.00, .17]), but there was a significant effect of condition (F(1,25) = 29.68, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
.54, 90% CI [.29, .67]) but no significant interaction between factors (F(3,75) = 1.55, p = 
0.21, ηp
2 = .06, 90% CI [.00, .13]). Nine participants failed to show performance of 60% and 
above on the predictive/irrelevant condition in the last half of training. Six of those 




Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 82.69% (3.33 SEM) for the recombined condition and 89.90% (2.78 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,75) = 22.78, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .48, 
90% CI [.32, .56]) and a significant main effect of condition (F(1,25) = 8.66, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = 
.26, 90% CI [.05, .45]). There was no significant interaction of factors (F < 1, p = 0.94). 
 
Test stage: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 5b. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was greater for the predictive 
condition than the uncertain condition.   A 2 (predictiveness: predictive cues (AC, BD) vs. 
uncertain cues (PR, QS)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PR) vs. 4 (BD, QS)) ANOVA was 
conducted. There was a significant main effect on outcome (F(1,25) = 42.12, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
.63, 90% CI [.40, .74]), but no significant effect of predictiveness (F < 1, p = 0.76). The 
interaction between these factors was significant (F(1,25) = 7.23, p = 0.013, ηp
2 = .22, 90% 
CI [.03, .42]) indicating that the effect of outcome was significantly greater for the predictive 
condition than the uncertain condition. Simple main effects analysis showed that the effect of 
outcome was significant for both the uncertain (F(1,25) = 8.81, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = .26, 90% CI 
[.05, .45]) and predictive cues (F(1,25) = 36.82, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .60, 90% CI [.36, .71]). 
Analysis of the test phase results excluding the participants that failed to meet the stage 1 
learning criterion showed a similar pattern of results (see Supplementary Material, Table S1 





 In order to calculate the strength of evidence for replication of the results of Experiment 4a 
we calculated a replication Bayes factor (the Bayes factor for the two experiments combined 
as a ratio of the Bayes factor for Experiment 4a). We conducted Bayesian t-tests comparing 
the difference between QS and PR with the difference between BD and AC. For Experiment 
4a, BF10 = 31.77 and for both experiments combined, BF10 = 216.7. Therefore, the replication 
BF10 = 6.82, suggesting that evidence for replication of the predictiveness effect was 6.82 




Experiments 4a and 4b demonstrated that predictive cues were learnt more readily than 
uncertain cues in stage 2 suggesting that predictive cues received more attention than 
uncertain cues. These results are consistent with the those of Livesey, et al. (2011), but are 
inconsistent with the results of Experiments 2a and 2b, in which fewer uncertain cues were 
learnt in stage 1 training. This suggests that a factor that determines whether attention is paid 
to uncertain cues or predictive cues is the number of uncertain cues in stage 1 training. This 
factor was tested directly in Experiment 5. 
 
Experiment 5 
The procedures for Experiments 2a, 2b and 4b were identical except for the number of 
uncertain compounds in stage 1. When participants had few uncertain compounds in stage 1 
they learnt more about uncertain cues than predictive cues (Experiment 2a and 2b), but when 
they received a greater number of uncertain compounds they learnt more about predictive 
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cues than uncertain cues (Experiment 4b). Experiment 5 directly tested the effect of the 
number of uncertain compounds on changes in associability of predictive and uncertain cues. 
Participants were trained with either four uncertain compounds in stage 1 (replicating the 
procedure of Experiment 2a and 2b) or with eight uncertain compounds (replicating the 
procedure of Experiment 4a and 4b).    
 
Participants:  Forty-eight people participated in the experiment, and were randomly allocated 
to one of two groups (N = 24 per group). In group few there were 17 females and 7 males and 
the age range was 18-31 (mean: 23.96, SD: 6.00). In group many there were 15 females and 9 
males and the age range was 19-35 (mean: 22.79, SD: 4.05). All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision.  All other details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
 
Apparatus and stimuli: All details were the same as Experiments 2a and 4b. 
 
Procedure: Participants were randomly allocated to one of two groups. Group few received 
the same procedure as Experiment 2a in which there were four uncertain compounds in stage 
1. Group many received the same procedure as Experiment 4b in which there eight uncertain 
compounds. The procedures of Experiment 2a and 4b, and therefore, also of groups few and 
many were identical in all respects except in the number of uncertain compounds in stage 1 
(see Tables 1 and 3). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
for the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks, but no improvement for the uncertain 
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condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) for the 
predictive /irrelevant condition was 77.08% (3.25 SEM) for group few and 70.31% (3.21 
SEM) for group many. For the uncertain condition, it was 47.40% (1.80 SEM) for group few 
and 45.96% (1.49 SEM) for group many. There was a significant effect of predictiveness 
(F(1,46) = 87.59, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .66, 90% CI [.51, .74]), which interacted with block 
(F(3,138) = 16.65, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .27, 90% CI [.15, .35]). Block also interacted with group 
(F(3,138) = 2.79, p = 0.043, ηp
2 = .06, 90% CI [.001, .11]), but there was no significant 
predictiveness by group interaction (F(1,46) = 2.21, p  = 0.14, ηp
2 = .05, 90% CI [.00, .17]) 
nor significant predictiveness by group by block 3-way interaction (F < 1, p = 0.53), 
suggesting that any difference between the two groups over the course of training was not 
specific to the predictive/irrelevant condition. Five participants in group few and seven in 
group many failed to show performance of 60% and above on the predictive/irrelevant 
condition in the last half of training. Of those participants, one in group few and one in group 




Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) for the recombined condition was 81.77% (4.70  SEM) for group few and 80.21% (3.60 
SEM) for group many. For the novel condition is was 86.46% (3.09 SEM) for group few and 
83.85% (3.49 SEM) for group many. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,138) = 
52.60, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .53, 90% CI [.43, .60]), but no other significant effects or interactions 




Test stage: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 6. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. For 
group few, the difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was greater for the 
uncertain condition than the predictive condition.  The opposite was true for group many, 
with the difference between the cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 being greater for the 
predictive cues than for the uncertain cues. A 2(group: few vs. many) by 2 (predictiveness: 
predictive cues (AC, BD) vs. uncertain cues (PR, QS)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PR) vs. 4 (BD, 
QS)) ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of outcome (F(1,46) = 56.25, p 
< 0.001, ηp
2 = .55, 90% CI [.38, .66]), but no significant effect of predictiveness (F(1,46) = 
2.73, p = 0.11, ηp
2 = .06, 90% CI [.00, .19]). There was no significant interaction between 
predictiveness and outcome (F < 1, p = 0.70), but there was a significant three-way 
interaction between group, predictiveness and outcome, (F(1,46) = 24.50, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 
.35, 90% CI [.16, .49]). There were no other significant effects or interactions of factors (p 
values > 0.1). The three-way interaction was explored by conducting separate ANOVAs for 
each group. For group few there was a significant predictiveness by outcome interaction 
(F(1,23) = 8.21, p = 0.009, ηp
2 = .26, 90% CI [.04, .46]) indicating that the effect of outcome 
was significantly greater for the uncertain condition than the predictive condition. Simple 
main effects analysis showed that while there was a significant effect of outcome for the 
uncertain cues (F(1,23) = 29.66, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .56, 90% CI [.30, .69]), but there was not for 
the predictive cues (F(1,23) = 1.23, p = 0.28, ηp
2 = .05, 90% CI [.00, .23]). For group many, 
there was a significant predictiveness by outcome interaction (F(1,23) = 19.47, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= .46, 90% CI [.19, .62]) indicating that the effect of outcome was significantly greater for 
the predictive condition than for the uncertain condition. Simple main effects analysis 
showed that the effect of outcome was significant for both predictive (F(1,23) = 77.12, p 
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<0.001, ηp
2 = .77, 90% CI [.59, .84]) and uncertain cues (F(1,23) = 9.71, p = 0.005, ηp
2 = .30, 
90% CI [.06, .49]). Analysis of the test phase results excluding the participants that failed to 
meet the stage 1 learning criterion showed a similar pattern of results (see Supplementary 
Material, Table S1 and Figure S4). 
 
 
The results of group few replicated the uncertainty effect observed in Experiments 2a and 2b 
and the results of group many replicated the predictiveness effect observed in Experiments 4a 
and 4b. In order to calculate the strength of evidence for replication of the uncertainty and 
predictiveness effects we calculated replication Bayes factors. We conducted Bayesian t-tests 
comparing the difference between QS and PR with the difference between BD and AC. For 
the uncertainty effect observed in group few, the replication Bayes factor was the Bayes 
factor for combined data of Experiments 2a and 2b and those of group few (BF10 = 2071) as a 
ratio of the Bayes factor of the combined data of Experiments 2a and 2b (BF10 = 69.74). 
Therefore, the replication BF10 = 29.70, suggesting that evidence for replication of the 
uncertainty effect was 29.70 times greater than for no effect of uncertainty. For the 
predictiveness effect, the replication Bayes factor was the Bayes factor for the combined data 
of Experiments 4a and 4b and those of group many (BF10 = 107027) as a ratio of the Bayes 
factor for the combined data of Experiments 4a and 4b (BF10 = 216.7). Therefore, the 
replication BF10 = 493.89, suggesting that evidence for replication of the predictiveness effect 
was 493.89 times greater than for no effect of predictiveness. 
 
Separate analyses were carried out in order to test whether performance in the last block of 
the predictive/irrelevant condition correlated with the uncertainty effect in group few and the 
predictiveness effect in group many that was observed in the test phase. Performance in the 
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test phase was converted to a single score by subtracting the difference between QS and PR 
from the difference between BD and AC. The correlation was not significant for group few 
(r(22) = 0.003, p = 0.99) and for group many (r(22) = –0.13, p = 0.54). 
 
 
The results of Experiment 5 replicate the findings of Experiments 2a and 2b and Experiments 
4a and 4b. When participants were trained with four uncertain compounds uncertain cues 
were learnt more readily than predictive cues, but the pattern was the opposite when the 
number of uncertain cues was increased to eight cues. This suggests that the crucial 
difference between the results of Experiments 2a and 2b and 4a and 4b and those of Livesey, 
et al. (2011) was the difficulty of the stage 1 training determined by the number of trials that 
were impossible to learn. Importantly, the results show that the uncertainty effect that was 
observed when there were few uncertain compounds is robust. This effect was observed in 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 (group few). Similarly, the predictiveness effect that was observed 
when there were eight uncertain compounds is also robust and was observed repeatedly in 
Experiments 4a, 4b and 5 (group many). 
 
Experiment 6 
The collective results of Experiments 2-5 suggest that attention is greater for uncertain cues 
than predictive cues when participants are required to learn about four uncertain cues, but this 
pattern switches when the number is eight uncertain cues. A number of factors are affected 
by the increase in uncertain cues. Thus, as a consequence of the increase in trial types, the 
average inter-trial interval between repetitions of the same trial-type is longer. The overall 
memory load in terms of the total number of cues is also increased. While the predictiveness 
effect was observed in Experiments 4 and 5 when the number of uncertain cues was 
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increased, it is possible that an increase in cues generally may be sufficient to cause the 
predictiveness effect. This was tested in Experiment 6. Participants received a procedure 
similar to that used in Experiment 4b and for group many in Experiment 5. However, instead 
of receiving training with eight uncertain compounds, they received training with four 
uncertain compounds and four extra compounds consisting of one predictive cue and one 
irrelevant cue. If associability is higher for predictive cues than uncertain cues in 
Experiments 4-5 because of the increase in memory load (i.e., number of cues) and/or 
increased temporal spacing of trial types then four extra predictive/irrelevant compounds 
should also lead to increase in associability of predictive cues relative to uncertain cues.  




Participants: Twenty-four people (17 females, 7 males) participated in Experiment 6. The 
age range was 19-26 (mean: 21.08, SD: 2.08). All other details were the same as Experiment 
1. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli: The apparatus and stimuli were the same as Experiment 4b. 
 
Procedure: The procedure was the same as Experiment 4b and the many condition in 
Experiment 5 except that the compounds ZM, ZO, NO and NM during stage 1 training were 
not uncertain cues, but now reliably led to particular outcomes (see Table 4). Specifically, 
ZM and ZO led to outcome 1 and NO and NM led to outcome 2. 
 
Results and Discussion 
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Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
for the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks, but no improvement for the uncertain 
condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 77.34% 
(3.31 SEM) for the predictive/irrelevant condition and 45.31% (2.79 SEM) for the uncertain 
condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,69) = 4.85, p < 0.04, ηp
2 = .17, 90% CI 
[.04, .28]) and a significant effect of condition (F(1,23) = 83.31, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .78, 90% CI 
[.61, .85]). There was a significant interaction between factors (F(3,69) = 8.78, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= .28, 90% CI [.11, .38]). Four participants failed to show performance of 60% and above on 




Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 80.73% (3.45 SEM) for the recombined condition and 90.62% (2.52 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,69) = 38.41, p < 0.001 ηp
2 = .63, 
90% CI [.49, .69]), but no significant main effect of condition (F(1,23) = 1.18, p = 0.29, , ηp
2 
= .05, 90% CI [.00, .23]). There was no significant interaction of factors (F(3,69) = 1.91, p 
=0.14, ηp
2 = .08, 90% CI [.00, .16]). 
 
Test: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 7. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 was similar for the predictive and 
uncertain conditions.  A 2 (predictiveness: predictive cues (AC, BD) vs. uncertain cues (PR, 
QS)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PR) vs. 4 (BD, QS)) ANOVA was conducted. There was no 
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significant effect of predictiveness (F(1,23) = 1,23) = 2.63, p = .32, ηp
2 = .10, 90% CI [.00, 
.30]), but there was a significant effect of outcome (F(1,23) = 46.32, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .67, 
90% CI [.44, .77]). There was no significant interaction between factors (F < 1, p = 0.71). In 
order to assess whether the data provided evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e., no difference 
in the extent of learning between predictive and uncertain cues) a Bayesian t-test (Cauchy 
scale = 0.707) was performed in JASP (Love, et al., 2019) comparing the difference between 
the ratings for BD and AC and the difference for QS and PR. It was found that BF10 = 0.23, 
suggesting that the evidence favoured the null hypothesis. In addition, given the failure to 
replicate the predictiveness effect using four extra predictive compounds rather uncertain 
compounds, we calculated a replication Bayes factor in order to assess the evidence for a lack 
of replication. We conducted Bayesian t-tests comparing the difference between QS and PR 
with the difference between BD and AC. The replication Bayes factor was the Bayes factor 
for the combined data of Experiments 4a, 4b, group many from Experiment 5 and 
Experiment 6 (BF10 = 10224) as a ratio of the Bayes factor for the combined data of 
Experiments 4a, 4b and group many from Experiment 5 (BF10 = 107027). Therefore, the 
replication Bayes factor was BF10 = 0.096, suggesting evidence for a lack of replication of 
the predictiveness effect in Experiment 6 was more than 10 times greater than the evidence 
for a replication of the predictiveness effect. A similar analysis was conducted to assess 
evidence for a failure to replicate the uncertainty effect observed in Experiment 2a, 2b and 
group few in Experiment 5. The replication Bayes factor was the Bayes factor for the 
combined data of Experiments 2a, 2b, group few from Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 (BF10 
= 187) as a ratio of the Bayes factor for the combined data of Experiments 2a, 2b and group 
few from Experiment 5 (BF10 = 2071). Therefore, the replication Bayes factor was BF10 = 
0.090, suggesting evidence for a lack of replication of the uncertainty effect in Experiment 6 
was more than 11 times greater than the evidence for a replication of the uncertainty effect. 
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Analysis of the test phase results excluding the participants that failed to meet the stage 1 
learning criterion showed a similar pattern of results (see Supplementary Material, Table S1 
and Figure S5). 
 
The results failed to demonstrate that four extra predictive/irrelevant compounds resulted in 
greater associability of predictive cues over uncertain cues. Instead, learning for predictive 
and uncertain cues was similar in the test phase suggesting that both types of cues received 
similar levels of attention during training. This failure to find a difference between cues 
indicates that it is unlikely that the effect of increased number of uncertain cues in 
Experiment 4 and 5 (group many) was simply the result of increased memory load. 
Furthermore, it suggests that it was also not due to an increase in the average interval 
between repetitions of the same cue over trials (i.e., a trial spacing effect). The failure to find 
an effect may instead suggest that the crucial factor is the number of uncertain compounds, 
not just the number of cues per se. While this is possible, we are cautious about this 
interpretation because the present experiment did not include a condition in which 
participants received four extra uncertain compounds, rather than predictive/irrelevant 
compounds, which would have acted as a positive control.  
 
Although we did not find that four extra predictive/irrelevant compounds led to greater 
attention to predictive cues over uncertain cues as in Experiments 4 and 5, we also did not 
find the opposite effect, which we found in Experiments 2 and 5 (group few). Once again, we 
are cautious about making comparisons across experiments, but this suggests that the switch 
between greater attention to uncertain cues to greater attention to predictive cues depends on 
a number of factors such as the number of cues and whether it is possible to learn about those 
cues (i.e., impossible discriminations). These factors may both act to generally increase task 
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The results of Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 demonstrate that uncertain cues increase in 
associability compared to predictive cues in particular circumstances. The results are 
consistent with the predictions of the Pearce-Hall model (1980) that proposes that the effect 
of uncertainty on attention is determined by its use of a summed error term. That uncertain 
cues were learnt more readily than irrelevant cues in Experiment 1 is also consistent with 
associability being determined by a summed error term, because while individual error was 
equated between uncertain and irrelevant cues in that experiment, the summed error in stage 
2 training was greater for uncertain than for irrelevant cues. To test further the role of 
summed error in determining uncertainty effects on attention we conducted Experiments 7 
and 8. Following the design of the experiments by Livesey, et al. (2011), in Experiment 7 
participants were trained on a biconditional discrimination (Saavedra, 1975), in addition to 
being trained on four uncertain compounds. For the biconditional discrimination the cues 
were presented in a similar manner as the uncertain cues in Experiments 1-6, but rather than 
each compound being equally paired with two outcomes (e.g., PQ-1/2, RS-1/2, PS-1/2, RQ-
1/2), each compound reliably led to only one outcome (e.g., PQ-1, RS-1, PS-2, RQ-2). 
Therefore, similar to cues in the uncertain compounds used in Experiment 1-6, the individual 
cues in the biconditional discrimination were not predictive of the outcome because across 
compounds they equally paired with each outcome. Consequently the individual prediction 
error for each cue on any given trial was high. In contrast to uncertain compounds of cues, 
however, the summed error for the biconditional discrimination cues will decrease as learning 
increases over the course of training, because the biconditional discrimination is soluble, with 
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each compound reliably leading to a particular outcome, whereas it is impossible to predict 
the outcome using the uncertain cues. Thus, the design of Experiment 7 seeks to manipulate 
the summed error of different stimulus compounds. Figure 8 shows the results of a simulation 
of the Pearce-Hall model for acquisition of a biconditional discrimination and changes in the 
associability () of biconditional discrimination and uncertain cues. It was assumed that each 
compound elicits a unique configural cue (see Wagner, 1971). This results in the solution to 
the biconditional discrimination due to the unique configural cues predicting the occurrence 
of one or the other outcome (e.g. PQW, RSX, PSY and RQZ). Across trials, alpha declines for 
the biconditional discrimination cues, but remains high for the uncertain cues. Therefore, 
similar to the difference between uncertain and irrelevant cues in Experiment 1, it would be 
expected that attention will be greater for uncertain cues than for cues used in a biconditional 





Participants: Thirty-two people (26 females, 6 males, age range: 18-29) participated in 
Experiment 7 (mean: 21.72, SD: 2.53) All other details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli: All details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure: In stage 1 of Experiment 7, participants were trained on a biconditional 
discrimination consisting of four compounds (see Table 5). Compounds PQ and RS were 
paired with outcome 1 and compounds PS and RQ were paired outcome 2. In addition, they 
were trained with four uncertain compounds (ZM, ZO, NO and NM) that equally led to 
outcomes 1 and 2 across trials. In stage 2, participants were trained with four compounds that 
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each consisted of a biconditional discrimination cue and an uncertain cue. Compounds PZ 
and RN were paired with outcome 3 and compounds QM and SO were paired with outcome 
4. In the test phase participants were presented with the compounds that consisted of either 
biconditional discrimination cues (PR, QS)  or irrelevant cues (ZN, MO). Compounds PR and 
ZN consisted of cues that had been paired with outcome 3 in stage 2 and compounds QS and 
MO consisted of cues paired with outcome 4 in stage 2. All other details were the same as 
Experiment 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination over training with performance increasing 
for the biconditional discrimination over blocks, but no improvement for the uncertain 
condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 62.70% 
(3.48 SEM) for the biconditional discrimination and 48.83% (1.72 SEM) for the uncertain 
condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,93) = 6.13, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .17, 90% 
CI [.05, .26]) and a significant effect of condition (F(1,31) = 17.30, p < 0.001 ηp
2 = .36, 90% 
CI [.14, .52]). There was a significant interaction between factors (F(3,93) = 3.70, p < 0.014 
ηp
2 = .11, 90% CI [.01, .19]). Seventeen participants failed to show performance of 60% and 
above on the biconditional discrimination condition in the last half of training. Eight of those 
participants failed to perform above 50% correct. 
 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 78.52% (2.71 SEM) for the recombined condition and 82.03% (3.37 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,93) = 38.87, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .56, 
90% CI [.43, .63]) and a significant main effect of condition (F(1,31) = 8.72, p = 0.006, ηp
2 = 
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.22, 90% CI [.04, .40]). The interaction between factors was not significant (F(3,93) = 2.69, p 
= 0.061, ηp
2 = .08, 90% CI [.00, .16]) 
 
Test: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 9. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (MO, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (ZN, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcome 4 and cues paired with outcome 3 was similar 
for the biconditional discrimination cues and the uncertain cues. A 2 (predictiveness: 
biconditional discrimination (PR, QS) vs. uncertain (MO, ZN)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (ZN, PR) 
vs. 4 (MO, QS)) ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of outcome (F(1,31) 
= 17.79, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .36, 90% CI [.14, .53]), but no significant effect predictiveness (F < 
1, p = 0.48) or significant interaction of factors (F < 1, p = 0.44). In order to assess whether 
the data provided evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e., no difference in the extent of learning 
between predictive and uncertain cues) a Bayesian t-test (Cauchy scale = 0.707) was 
performed comparing the difference between the ratings for QS and PR and the difference for 
ZM and MO. It was found that BF10 = 0.25, suggesting that evidence favoured the null 
hypothesis. Analysis of the test phase results excluding the participants that failed to meet the 
stage 1 learning criterion showed a similar pattern of results (see Supplementary Material, 
Table S1 and Figure S6). 
 
 
The results of the test phase failed to demonstrate a significant difference in the associability 
of uncertain and biconditional discrimination cues. One explanation of the lack of difference 
between conditions is that it is possible that biconditional discrimination cues and uncertain 
cues received similar levels of attention in stage 2 as a consequence of their training history 
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in stage 1. This possibility was explored in Experiments 8a and 8b. It is also possible, 
however, that the lack of difference between conditions was due to the large number of 
participants that failed to learn the biconditional discrimination to a sufficiently high level. 
Seventeen of the 32 participants did not meet the learning criterion of 60% correct and above 
in the last half of training. If participants failed to learn the biconditional discrimination then 
the biconditional discrimination cues would be as equally non-predictive of outcomes as 
uncertain cues. A reason for doubting whether a lack of learning led to the lack of difference 
in the associability of the cues is that when the analyses were restricted to the 15 participants 
that met the learning criterion Bayesian analysis still found evidence for the null hypothesis 
(BF10 < 0.33, see Supplementary Material). Therefore, a lack of difference in associability 
occurred despite successful learning of the biconditional discrimination. 
 
Experiments 8a and 8b 
Experiment 7 failed to find a significant difference between the levels of associability of 
uncertain and biconditional discrimination cues. This may suggest that the associability of 
cues used in a biconditional discrimination undergo similar changes to uncertain cues. 
Therefore, it may not be the summed error of the compound of cues that determines changes 
in associability, but instead, the prediction error of individual cues independent of the 
associative strength of cues present on a trial. If attention to biconditional discrimination cues 
changes in a similar manner as for uncertain cues then biconditional discrimination cues 
should function like uncertain cues in other circumstances. In order to test whether this is the 
case, Experiments 8a and 8b were replications of Experiments 2a and 4b (see also 
Experiments 2b and 5), but the four crucial uncertain cues from stage 1 that went on to be 
tested were replaced with four cues used in a biconditional discrimination. In Experiment 8a 
participants were trained on the biconditional discrimination as well as the 
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predictive/irrelevant compounds in stage 1. If biconditional discrimination cues are similar to 
uncertain cues then it would be expected that, under these circumstances, biconditional 
discrimination cues will be paid more attention than predictive cues in stage 2. Experiment 8b 
was similar to Experiment 8a, but there were four additional uncertain compounds in stage 1. 
These additional uncertain compounds led to attention being paid to predictive cues rather 
than uncertain cues in Experiments 4 and 5. If biconditional discrimination cues are similar to 
uncertain cues then it would be expected that, in this situation, biconditional discrimination 
cues will be paid less attention than predictive cues.  
 
Methods 
Participants: Twenty-one (15 females, 6 males, age range: 20-35) people participated in 
Experiment 8a (mean: 24.76, SD: 3.28) and twenty-four (20 females, 4 males, age range: 18-




Apparatus and stimuli: All details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure: In stage 1 of Experiment 8a, participants were trained on a biconditional 
discrimination in a similar manner to Experiment 7 (see Table 6). They also received training 
with eight compounds that consisted of one cue that was predictive of the outcome (A-D) 
over trials and one cue that was not predictive over trials (i.e., irrelevant cues: W-Y). In stage 
2, participants received training with compounds that consisted of one biconditional 
discrimination cue and one predictive cue. Compounds AP and CR were paired with outcome 
3 and compounds BQ and DS were paired with outcome 4. In the test phase, participants 
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were presented with compounds that consisted of either biconditional discrimination cues 
(PR, QS) or predictive cues (AC, BD). Compounds PR and AC consisted of cues previously 
paired with outcome 3 in stage 2 and compounds QS and BD consisted of cues previously 
paired with outcome 4 in stage 2. All other details were the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 8b was the same as Experiment 8a except that in stage 1 participants received 
training with four extra uncertain compounds (ZM, ZO, NM, NO) that were equally often 




Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination with performance increasing for the 
biconditional discrimination and the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks. Mean 
performance on the last block (four trials of each trial type) was 79.61% (3.76 SEM) for the 
predictive/irrelevant condition and 79.17% (3.49 SEM) for the biconditional discrimination 
condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,60) = 28.80, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .59, 90% 
CI [.43, .67]), but no significant effect of condition (F(1,20) = 2.57, p = 0.12, ηp
2 = .11, 90% 
CI [.00, .33]) or interaction of factors (F < 1, p = 0.43). Five participants failed to show 
performance of 60% and above on the biconditional discrimination condition in the last half 
of training. Two of those participants failed to perform above 50% correct. 
 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 86.31% (3.75 SEM) for the recombined condition and 84.52% (3.65 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,60) = 26.69, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .57, 
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90% CI [.41, .65]), but no significant main effect of condition (F < 1, p > 0.99). The 
interaction between factors was not significant (F < 1, p = 0.58). 
 
Test: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 10a. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcome and 4 and cues paired with outcome 3 was 
greater for the biconditional discrimination cues than the predictive cues. A 2 (predictiveness: 
biconditional discrimination (PR, QS) vs. predictive (AC, BD)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PR) 
vs. 4 (BD, QS)) ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of outcome (F(1,20) 
= 59.39, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .75, 90% CI [.54, .83]), but no significant effect predictiveness (F < 
1, p = 0.78). There was a significant predictiveness by outcome interaction (F(1,20) = 8.74, p 
= 0.008, ηp
2 = .30, 90% CI [.05, .50]) indicating that the effect of outcome was significantly 
greater for the biconditional discrimination condition than for the predictive condition. 
Simple main effects analysis revealed that the effect of outcome was significant for both 
biconditional discrimination cues (F(1,20) = 82.17, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .80, 90% CI [.63, .86]) 
and predictive cues (F(1,20) = 15.74, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = .44, 90% CI [.15, .61]). Analysis of the 
test phase results excluding the participants that failed to meet the stage 1 learning criterion 
showed a similar pattern of results (see Supplementary Material, Table S1 and Figure S7). 
 
Experiment 8b 
Stage 1: Participants acquired the discrimination with performance increasing for the 
biconditional discrimination and the predictive/irrelevant condition over blocks but no 
improvement for the uncertain condition. Mean performance on the last block (four trials of 
each trial type) was 71.87% (3.36 SEM) for the predictive/irrelevant condition and 68.53% 
(3.43 SEM) for the biconditional discrimination condition, and 40.36% (2.55 SEM) for the 
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uncertain condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,69) = 7.84, p < 0.001 ηp
2 = 
.25, 90% CI [.10, .36]) and a significant effect of condition ([F(2,46) = 49.45, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= .68, 90% CI [.53, .75]) and a significant interaction of factors (F(6,138) = 6.84, p < 0.001, 
ηp
2 = .23, 90% CI [.11, .30]). A separate ANOVA restricted just to the predictive/irrelevant 
and biconditional discrimination conditions failed to find an effect of condition (F < 1, p = 
0.88) and a condition by block interaction (F < 1, p = 0.45). Nine participants failed to show 
performance of 60% and above on the biconditional discrimination condition in the last half 
of training, but all of them performed above 50% correct. 
 
 
Stage 2: Participants acquired the discrimination over training for both the novel cues and the 
recombined cues from stage 1. Mean performance on the last block (two trials of each trial 
type) was 84.90% (3.19 SEM) for the recombined condition and 89.68% (3.15 SEM) for the 
novel condition. There was a significant effect of block (F(3,69) = 30.48, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .60, 
90% CI [.42, .65]), but no significant main effect of condition (F(1,23) = 2.47, p = 0.13, ηp
2 = 
.10, 90% CI [.00, .30]).The interaction between factors was not significant (F < 1, p = 0.63). 
 
Test: The ratings for the test stage are shown in Figure 10b. The ratings for compounds 
consisting of cues paired with outcome 4 (BD, QS) were higher than for those paired with 
outcome 3 (AC, PR), indicating that participants learnt the cue-outcome associations. The 
difference between cues paired with outcome 4 and cues paired with outcome 3 was greater 
for the predictive cues than the biconditional discrimination cues. A 2 (predictiveness: 
biconditional discrimination (PR, QS) vs. predictive (AC, BD)) by 2 (outcome: 3 (AC, PR) 
vs. 4 (BD, QS)) ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of outcome (F(1,23) 
= 60.10, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .72, 90% CI [.52, .81]), but no significant effect predictiveness 
(F(1,23) = 1.24, p = 0.28, ηp
2 = .05, 90% CI [.00, .23]). There was a significant predictiveness 
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by outcome interaction (F(1,23) = 4.70, p = 0.041, ηp
2 = .17, 90% CI [.004, .37]). Simple 
main effects analysis revealed that the effect of outcome was significant for both 
biconditional discrimination cues (F(1,23) = 15.92, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .41, 90% CI [.14, .58]) 
and predictive cues (F(1,23) = 53.39, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = .70, 90% CI [.48, .79]). Analysis of the 
test phase results excluding the participants that failed to meet the stage 1 learning criterion 




Experiments 8a and 8b demonstrated that biconditional discrimination cues functioned in a 
similar way to uncertain cues. The associability of biconditional discrimination cues 
depended on the total number of compounds that consisted of cues that individually were not 
predictive of the outcome. Thus, in Experiment 8a in which participants were trained with 
four biconditional discrimination cues and no extra uncertain cues, participants learnt more 
about biconditional discrimination cues than predictive cues. In contrast, in Experiment 8b, in 
which participants were also trained with four extra uncertain cues, participants learnt more 
about predictive cues than biconditional discrimination cues.  
 
Across Experiments 8a-8b biconditional discrimination cues functioned in a similar manner 
to uncertain cues in that they were learnt more readily than predictive cues in stage 2 when 
there were four uncertain compounds and the opposite was true when there were eight 
uncertain compounds. This  may suggest that the ability of the configuration of cues to 
predict the outcome does not affect the attention paid to cues that individually are not 
predictive. Therefore, these results are contrary to our predictions based on the results of 
Experiment 1 and the predictions of the Pearce-Hall (1980) model, that the summed error of a 
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compound determines the effect of uncertainty on attention. Instead, the results suggest that 
the individual prediction error of cues, independent of the summed error of the compound, 
determines uncertainty and predictiveness effects. While it is possible that the summed error 
of biconditional discrimination compounds and predictive/irrelevant compounds may have 
differed, depending on the assumptions of how configural discriminations are learnt (e.g., 
Pearce, 1987; Rescorla, 1973; Wagner, 2003), there was no significant difference in the 
accuracy of performance across blocks for the two conditions in both experiments. Therefore, 
this suggests that both discriminations were learnt to a similar extent over training and that 
differences in the test are unlikely due to differences in the summed error of the compounds. 
 
The similar levels of acquisition of the predictive/irrelevant discrimination and the 
biconditional discrimination are surprising because it is typically found that biconditional 
discriminations are harder to learn than simple, nonconfigural discriminations in which 
individual cues reliably lead to an outcome (Livesey, Don, Uengoer, & Thorwart, 2019; 
Livesey, et al., 2011; Saavedra, 1975). Indeed biconditional discriminations are usually found 
to be harder to learn than other non-linear configural discriminations such as the negative 
patterning discrimination (Harris & Livesey, 2008). It is not clear what the cause of the 
failure to observe a difference between conditions may be, but in comparison to Livesey, et 
al. (2011) who did find a difference using procedures similar to those in Experiment 8, it is 
noticeable that in their study acquisition of the predictive/irrelevant condition was superior to 
acquisition in Experiments 8a and 8b. Therefore, the lack of difference between the 
predictive/irrelevant condition and biconditional discrimination condition in the current 
experiment may be due to the surprisingly low level of learning in the predictive/irrelevant 
condition rather than a surprisingly high level of learning on the biconditional discrimination. 
The relatively poor performance on the predictive/irrelevant condition may mask a difference 
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between the conditions. It is also possible that the lack of difference may be due to 
participants encoding the compounds in a configural manner in both conditions even though 
the predictive/irrelevant condition did not require a configural solution (Alvarado & Rudy, 
1992; Astur & Sutherland, 1998; Healey & Gaffan, 2001; Shanks & Darby, 1998). This 
seems unlikely, however, because this would have led to no advantage of one type of cue 




Across Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 (group few) participants learnt more about cues that had 
previously led to an uncertain outcome compared to cues that were predictive of an outcome. 
The results provide a robust demonstration of uncertainty having a positive effect on 
associability in a learning task in humans.  In contrast, Experiments 4a, 4b and 5 (group 
many) demonstrated the opposite pattern of results, and participants learnt more about 
predictive cues than uncertain cues. These results are more in line with previous work 
demonstrating a role for predictiveness in human associative learning (Le Pelley, et al., 
2016). Importantly, the key factor that determined whether an uncertainty effect 
(Experiments 2 and 5) or a predictiveness effect (Experiment 4 and 5) was observed was the 
number of uncertain cues that participants were required to learn about. When the number 
was four, an uncertainty effect was found, but when it increased to eight, a predictiveness 
effect was found. The effect of the number of uncertain cues was directly tested in 
Experiment 5 and it was found that the number determined the nature of the change in 
associability that occurred as a consequence of learning. Furthermore, the number of 
compounds consisting of two cues that were individually nonpredictive of outcomes also 
determined whether biconditional discrimination cues or cues that were individually 
predictive of outcomes increased in associability. Thus, in Experiment 8a, when the number 
of compounds was four, participants learnt more about biconditional discrimination cues than 
predictive cues and in Experiment 8b, the opposite was true when the number of compounds 
was eight. 
 
The finding that uncertain cues increased in associability relative to predictive cues in 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 was in contrast to results of Livesey, et al. (2011). The cause of the 
difference between our results and theirs was not the nature of stimuli or cover story 
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(Experiment 2b) and not the manner in which cues were combined in stage 2 and in the test 
phase (Experiment 4a and 4b). Instead, it was the number of uncertain cues that were 
presented in stage 1 training. As mentioned above, the effect of the number of uncertain cues 
also determined whether participants learnt more about biconditional cues or predictive cues. 
Therefore, the number of uncertain cues was repeatedly found to be a key determinant of 
whether an uncertainty or predictiveness effect was found. 
 
 The current results demonstrate that uncertainty can affect the associability of cues 
indicating that uncertain cues received more processing than predictive cues in certain 
conditions. Changes in associability reflect changes in attentional resources. In the current 
experiments it is not known whether uncertainty affected other measures of attention. A study 
by Beesley, et al. (2015) provided some evidence that overt attention, as measured by eye 
gaze, is greater for uncertain cues than predictive cues. In that study, however, increased 
overt attention did not translate into greater associability of cues. Therefore, overt attention 
did not necessarily result in greater processing and encoding of information. Although 
associability is an indirect measure of attention generally, it’s advantage over other measures 
it that it provides a measure of the depth of selective processing. It remains to be seen 




The role of task difficulty in modulating associability 
The role of the number of uncertain cues suggests that it is the level of task difficulty that 
determines whether uncertain cues or predictive cues are paid more attention. Experiment 6 
was designed to test the nature of the task difficulty. In that experiment participants received 
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additional compounds that should increase the overall memory load, but in contrast to 
Experiments 4 and 5 the extra compounds included a cue that was predictive and one cue that 
was irrelevant rather than consisting of two nonpredictive cues. In the test phase, participants 
showed similar levels of learning for uncertain and predictive cues, suggesting that the 
increase in the number of cues was not sufficient to switch attention towards predictive cues. 
Equally, the failure to find an uncertainty effect may suggest that the additional compounds 
made the task sufficiently difficult to not see such an effect. While we are cautious about 
drawing conclusions from a null result, the results suggest that the crucial factor for 
determining whether attention switches to predictive cues is the increase in the number of 
uncertain cues.  Therefore, not only does the cognitive load need to be high, but also the 
number of uncertain cues has to be high. 
 
If the number of uncertain compounds affects cognitive load then it may be expected that 
learning in the first stage of the procedure should be poorer when participants receive the 
more complex procedure with eight uncertain compounds compared to those that receive 
only found uncertain compounds. We failed to observe this effect in Experiment 5 in which 
performance under both procedures (four or eight uncertain compounds) was directly 
compared. In order to provide a more robust test of this prediction we pooled the data across 
the experiments that used four uncertain compounds (Experiments 2a, 2b and condition few 
of Experiment 5) and those that used eight uncertain compounds (Experiments 4a, 4b and 
condition many of Experiment 5) and compared performance on the predictive/irrelevant 
condition across the four blocks of stage 1. Mean performance across blocks 1-4 was 59%, 
68%, 72 and 77% correct for the four uncertain compounds condition and 58%, 62%, 68% 
and 69% correct for the eight uncertain compounds condition. It was found that there was 
significant condition (four versus eight uncertain compounds) by block interaction, F(3,480) 
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=4.41, p = 0.007, ηp
2 = .03, 90% CI [.005, .05]). These results suggest that the number of 
uncertain cues did affect the ease at which learning occurred for the predictive/irrelevant 
condition. It is important to note that in  Experiment 6 in which neither an uncertainty or 
predictiveness effect was observed, performance in the last block of stage 1 training for was 
77% correct. This level of performance is similar to that found across the combined data of 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 (few condition) in which an uncertainty effect was found (see 
above). While we are cautious about drawing conclusions across experiments, this may 
suggest that an increase in cues in Experiment 6 was sufficient to abolish an uncertainty 
effect in the test phase but not sufficient to reduce levels of accuracy in stage 1 training. 
While we have described memory load as a factor that affects task difficulty, increasing 
memory load does not necessarily reduce accuracy on the stage 1 discrimination. This could 
be due to a number of reasons. For example, there may be different thresholds for an effect of 
memory load on accuracy and on associability. Nonetheless, the pattern of data across 
experiments suggests that manipulations of task complexity (memory load and the 
uncertainty of the cues) has a greater effect on associability than on accuracy of learning.  
 
The switch between the uncertainty effect and the predictiveness effect may reflect the effect 
of task difficulty on controlled attention. Controlled attention will be engaged in order to 
reduce uncertainty (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977), but the ability to do this may be weakened as task difficulty increases. In contrast, 
attention paid to predictive cues may reflect a more automatic form of attention (Le Pelley, 
Vadillo, & Luque, 2013; Luque, Vadillo, Le Pelley, & Beesley, 2017; but see Mitchell, 
Griffiths, Seetoo, & Lovibond, 2012, for a potential role of controlled processing in the 
predictiveness effect). When task difficulty is low the effect of controlled attention paid to 
uncertain cues may be greater than the automatic attention paid to predictive cues, but as task 
 64 
difficulty increases the cognitive resources required to engage controlled attention are 
decreased such that automatic attention wins out over controlled attention. In other words, 
when there is a low level of difficulty participants actively engage in a strategy of exploration 
of cues in order to resolve uncertainty, but when there is a higher level of difficulty 
participants switch to a less effortful strategy of exploitation of predictive cues. 
 
Another possibility is that the task difficulty influences the extent to which uncertainty is 
surprising or instead, expected (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Yu & 
Dayan, 2005). For example, Easdale, et al. (2017) manipulated the overall degree of 
uncertainty in a learning task and then, in a second stage, examined the ability of participants 
to learn new associations that led to particular outcomes in a probabilistic manner. For some 
participants, the level of uncertainty in the second stage was surprising (i.e., it was greater 
than previously experienced), while for other participants the level of uncertainty across both 
stages of training was the same. It was found that participants that experienced a surprising 
level of uncertainty learnt faster in the second stage than participants that received a constant 
level of uncertainty. In the present experiments, it is possible that a large number of uncertain 
cues increases the experience of uncertainty such that it is expected. This may lead to a 
reduction in the attention paid to uncertain cues. When the number of uncertain cues is low or 
they are relatively scarce compared to predictive cues, then uncertainty is still surprising and, 
therefore, attention remains high. The results of Experiment 6, in which it was found that 
there was no significant advantage of uncertain cues over predictive cues when the number of 
predictive cues was increased, suggests that the number or proportion of uncertain cues 
cannot be the only factor that determines whether uncertainty is surprising. Thus, in 
Experiment 6, the uncertain cues were relatively scarce compared to predictive cues. This 
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should have led to uncertain cues being particularly surprising, but an uncertainty effect was 
not observed. 
 
Changes in associability depend on the individual prediction error of cues 
Cues that were uncertain by virtue of being involved in a biconditional discrimination 
underwent changes in associability in a similar manner to uncertain cues that were presented 
in compounds that were not predictive of outcomes (Experiments 7 and 8). This finding is in 
contrast to work demonstrating that cues used in non-linear configural discriminations are 
paid attention on the basis of whether they are relevant for learning (George & Pearce, 1999; 
Kruschke, 1996). In the present experiments, the biconditional discrimination cues were 
relevant, but whether they received greater attention than predictive cues or not depended on 
the level of task difficulty. The fact that the associability of biconditional discrimination cues 
changed in a manner that was similar to uncertain cues suggests that the effect of uncertainty 
on attention that was observed in Experiments 2 and 5 was not due to the summed error of 
the compounds. By the end of stage 1 training, summed error should be low for biconditional 
discrimination cues and high for uncertain cues. This contradicts the proposal of the Pearce-
Hall model (1980) that assumes that the summed error, reflecting the discrepancy between 
the outcome and the combined predictive strength of all the cues that are present on a trial, is 
positively related to the amount of attention that cues receive. The lack of difference between 
uncertain and biconditional cues, instead, suggests that it is the individual prediction error for 
each cue, independent of the other cues that are present, that determines the level of attention 
of attention that the cue receives in both circumstances in which individual prediction error 
leads to a reduction in associability relative to predictive cues (see also Livesey, et al., 2019; 
Livesey, et al., 2011) and increase in associability. It is important to note that the summed 
error of compounds in a biconditional discrimination cannot simply reflect the summed error 
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of the two individual cues. The two individual cues are uncertain due to being paired with 
outcomes 1 and 2 equally and, therefore, their combined associative strength will be equally 
nonpredictive of the particular outcomes. Therefore, the summed error that reduces as 
biconditional discrimination learning increases must reflect the associative strength of the 
aspects of the compound that reflect the unique configuration of the two cues (Pearce, 1987; 
Rescorla, 1973; Wagner, 2003). This means that while the individual error of cues used in a 
biconditional discrimination is not involved in the mechanism required for biconditional 
discrimination learning, our results suggest that it is involved in the mechanisms for changes 
in the associability of cues. 
 
While the results of Experiments 8a and 8b suggest that it is the individual prediction error of 
cues that drives changes in attention, the results of Experiment 1 do not fit with this claim. In 
Experiment 1 uncertain cues were learnt more readily than irrelevant cues. Both uncertain 
and irrelevant cues were non-predictive of outcomes, but irrelevant cues were presented in 
compound with predictive cues whereas uncertain cues were presented in compound with 
other uncertain cues. Therefore, the cues were matched for individual error, but the summed 
error of compounds was lower for irrelevant cues than for uncertain cues. The advantage of 
uncertain cues over irrelevant cues suggest that it is the summed error of the compound that 
affects attention, a conclusion that is line with the Pearce-Hall model (1980). The reasons for 
the discrepancy between the results of Experiment 1 and those of Experiments 8a and 8b are 
not clear, but one possibility is that irrelevant cues are subject to performance effects that do 
not apply to uncertain cues. It is possible that in Stage 1 participants learnt to ignore 
irrelevant cues due to the presence of the predictive cues and this avoidance response carried 
over to the Stage 2 training. This would have resulted in participants preferentially looking at 
uncertain cues over irrelevant cues. It has been demonstrated that participants orient towards 
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predictive cues even when there is no instrumental contingency between looking at the cue 
and the occurrence of the outcome (Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015), 
suggesting that the orienting response is controlled by Pavlovian associations. It is possible 
that a reciprocal avoidance response is also acquired to irrelevant stimuli. There are a number 
of demonstrations that stimuli that are irrelevant (either by virtue of being non-predictive and 
presented in compound with predictive stimuli or by being a redundant predictor) receive less 
overt attention than predictive cues (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Le Pelley, Beesley, & 
Griffiths, 2011; Luque, Vadillo, Gutierrez-Cobo, & Le Pelley, 2018), but it is not clear 
whether this is due to an increase in attention to predictive cues or due to a reduction in 
attention to irrelevant cues. Nonetheless, it is clear that irrelevant cues, as a consequence of 
being presented in compound with predictive cues, may be subject to a number of processes 
that contribute to a reduction in attention, in a manner that is different to uncertain cues. 
While this appears to be case in the present study (Experiment 1), a difference in the 
associability of irrelevant cues and uncertain cues is not always observed (Livesey, et al., 
2011). Whether task difficulty as determined by the number of uncertain compounds is the 
crucial factor that determines whether a difference between irrelevant cues and uncertain cues 
is observed remains to be seen. 
 
An associability versus an interference account of the uncertainty effect 
An alternative account of the uncertainty effect that was observed in Experiments 2 and 5 
with partially reinforced cues and in Experiment 8a with biconditional discrimination cues is 
that it reflects reduced interference from learning in stage 1. If learning in stage 1 interferes 
with learning in stage 2 then it would be expected that there would be interference for 
predictive cues because they had formed a strong association with either outcome 1 or 2 in 
stage 1, but not for uncertain, partially reinforced or biconditional discrimination cues 
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because they had not formed a strong association with a particular outcome. Any potential 
effect of interference, however, was reversed in Experiments 4, 5 (group many) and 8b in 
which it was found that individual cues that were predictive of outcomes in stage 1 were 
learnt about more readily in stage 2. If the uncertainty effect was caused by interference then 
it must be assumed that the interference and predictiveness effects are in competition with 
one another and that an increase in the number of uncertain cues either reduces the 
interference effect or enhances the predictiveness effect. This may be unlikely because the 
strength of interference in stage 2 should be related to how predictive a cue is in stage 1. 
Thus, any manipulation of one factor should similarly affect the other factor. Therefore, it is 
not clear how an interference account of the uncertainty effect can be incorporated with the 
predictiveness effect that was also observed across experiments. 
 
 
Does the predictiveness effect depend on task difficulty? 
Our results suggest that if task difficulty is low then the chance of finding an uncertainty 
effect will be increased. There are, however, examples of predictiveness effects that may be 
hard to explain in terms of task difficulty (e.g., Kattner, 2015; Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers, 
& Knipe, 2010). In the study by Le Pelley, Turnbull, et al. (2010), a predictiveness effect was 
found even though, in comparison to our experiments, the design of the task was simple. In 
the first experiment participants were required to learn about six cues that were presented 
individually across trials. Four cues were predictive in stage 1 training and two cues were 
uncertain by virtue to leading to two different outcomes equally often. In stage 2 the cues 
were once again presented individually, and they now led to new outcomes with each cue 
now being predictive of the particular outcome with which it was paired. The test phase 
examined how much participants had learnt about the cue-outcome associations in stage 2. 
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Therefore, any difference between the cues must reflect an effect of stage 1 training on 
subsequent learning of new associations. It was found that participants learnt more about the 
previously predictive cues than the uncertain cues. This procedure used fewer cues than our 
procedures and the number of uncertain cues was very low. Therefore, this finding does seem 
to contradict the idea that task difficulty influences attention. It is possible that when the 
design of tasks is very simple participants are more aware of the contingencies between cues 
and outcomes and engage in processes, such as propositional reasoning, that may be 
qualitatively different to the processes that are engaged when the task is more complex. Tasks 
may have to have a sufficient level of complexity for performance to reflect lower-level, 
associative learning processes that are engaged in incremental trial and error learning. While 
we can provide an explanation for why Livesey, et al. (2011) observed a predictiveness effect 
yet similar, simpler, experimental procedures produced the opposite uncertainty effect in the 
present experiments, it remains to be seen to what extent task difficulty can account for the 
presence or absence of an uncertainty effect using procedures that differ substantially from 
the ones used in the present study. 
 
Conclusion 
The results suggest that attention is allocated to stimuli in a top-down manner based on the 
prediction error associated with a cue and the current level of task difficulty determined by 
the level of uncertainty. There are parallels between this idea and that of perceptual load on 
selective attention (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004), but here, the load reflects a 
specific type of information (uncertainty) rather than just the total number of cues. The task 
now for theories of learning and attention is to understand the circumstances and decision 
making computations that determine the switch between attention for uncertain and 
predictive cues. We have shown in a narrow range of situations that people do reliably flip 
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between allocating attention to predictive and uncertain cues, but predicting which strategy is 
adopted in more complex situations requires greater understanding of the relevant task 
parameters. This, however, is important for determining when selective attention achieves 
efficient processing information and for when it leads to suboptimal selection of information. 
The balance between these processes is crucial for understanding the causes and 
consequences of impaired attention in psychopathology. 
 
In conclusion, the present results suggest that uncertainty does play a role in determining 
attention paid to cues in human associative learning tasks. This provides the first clear link 
between the role of uncertainty in associative processes in animals and in humans. In 
contrast, however, to the theoretical analysis of uncertainty effects in animals  (Pearce & 
Hall, 1980) our results suggest that uncertainty reflects the individual prediction error for 
cues rather than the summed prediction error. Furthermore, uncertainty is observed only 
under conditions in which the number of uncertain cues is low. Both uncertainty and 
predictiveness affect attention and the balance between the two processes is determined by 
the relative complexity/difficulty of the learning task. 
 
Context 
Modern associative learning theories emphasise the role of prediction error in determining 
learning and the factors, such as attention, that influence the speed and content of learning. In 
animals, there is a clear link between uncertainty, as reflected by the extent of prediction 
error, and learning. Furthermore, uncertainty is reflected in neural correlates of prediction 
error in animals. In humans, predictiveness has been found to affect the associability of cues, 
but there is less evidence for a role of uncertainty. The work reported here formed a large part 
of Chang-Mao Chao’s PhD thesis which was devoted to examining the relationship between 
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attention and learning. The work is part of a larger endeavour to examine how learning 
modulates attention to cues and to the signalled events and the nature of the information 
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Figure 1. Simulation of the Mackintosh (1975) model for two cues (A and B) that have a 
different initial values of  before conditioning in compound (ABoutcome). For the 
simulation the starting value of  for cue A was 0.5 and 0.45 for cue B.  equalled 1, and , 
the learning rate parameter determined by the US was 0.3. Changes in associative strength 
(V) over training is shown in the left panel and changes in  (the associability of the cue) is 
shown in the right panel. Over training cue A gains more associative strength than cue B. 
Whereas  increases for cue A, it decreases for cue B over training. 
 
Figure 2. Simulation of Pearce-Hall model (1980) for continuous reinforcement, in which a 
cue is reinforced on every trial, and partial reinforcement, in which a cue is reinforced on 
50% of trials. The starting value of , the associability of the cue, was 0.5.  equalled 1, and 
S, the learning rate parameter determined by the US was 0.3. The learning rate for the 
absence of the US was also set at 0.3. Changes in associative strength (V) over training is 
shown in the left panel and changes in  is shown in the right panel. Continuous 
reinforcement results in greater acquisition of associative strength (V) compared to partial 
reinforcement. Although there is an initial increase in  with continuous reinforcement,  
rapidly decreases as associative strength increases. With partial reinforcement, however,  
remains high. Simulations were run using the CAL-R Pearce-Hall Simulator (Grikietis, 
Mondragón, & Alonso, 2016). 
 
Figure 3. The results of the test phase of Experiments 1, 2a and 2b in panels a-c respectively. 
The likelihood that outcomes 3 and 4 would occur for each test compound was rated on a 
scale from 1-9 with scores below 5 indicating an expectation that outcome 3 would occur and 
scores above 5 indicating that outcome 4 would occur. Panel a: VX and WY were irrelevant 
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cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively.  PR and QS were uncertain cues paired with 
outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. Panel b and c: AC and BD were predictive cues paired with 
outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. PR and QS were uncertain cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 




Figure 4. The results of the test phase of Experiment 3. The likelihood that outcomes 3 and 4 
would occur for each test compound was rated on a scale from 1-9 with scores below 5 
indicating an expectation that outcome 3 would occur and scores above 5 indicating that 
outcome 4 would occur. AC and BD were predictive cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 
respectively. VX and WY were irrelevant cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. 
Error bars indicate SEM. 
 
Figure 5. The results of the test phase of Experiments 4a and 4b in panels a and b 
respectively. The likelihood that outcomes 3 and 4 would occur for each test compound was 
rated on a scale from 1-9 with scores below 5 indicating an expectation that outcome 3 would 
occur and scores above 5 indicating that outcome 4 would occur. AC and BD were predictive 
cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. In Experiment 5 (panel a), ZP and NR were 
uncertain cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. In Experiment 6 (panel b), PR and 
QS were uncertain cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. Error bars indicate SEM. 
 
Figure 6. The results of the test phase of Experiment 5. The mean ratings for group few are 
on the left and those for group many are on the right. The likelihood that outcomes 3 and 4 
would occur for each test compound was rated on a scale from 1-9 with scores below 5 
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indicating an expectation that outcome 3 would occur and scores above 5 indicating that 
outcome 4 would occur. AC and BD were predictive cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 
respectively. PR and QS were uncertain cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. 
Error bars indicate SEM. 
 
Figure 7. The results of the test phase of Experiment 6. The likelihood that outcomes 3 and 4 
would occur for each test compound was rated on a scale from 1-9 with scores below 5 
indicating an expectation that outcome 3 would occur and scores above 5 indicating that 
outcome 4 would occur. AC and BD were predictive cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 
respectively. PR and QS were uncertain cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. 
Error bars indicate SEM. 
 
Figure 8. Simulation of changes in alpha across trials for cues used in a biconditional 
discrimination and uncertain cues. The biconditional discrimination used the design PQ+, 
RS+, PS– and RQ–, in which + and – denote different outcomes. The same compounds were 
used for the uncertain cues, but each compound was equally paired with the two outcomes 
(i.e., PQ+/–, RS+/–, PS+/– and RQ+/–). It was assumed that the unique configuration of the 
compound was represented by an additional cue (i.e, PQW, RSX, PSY and RQZ). The starting 
value of  was 0.5 for each cue.  equalled 1, and S, the learning rate parameter determined 
by the outcome was 0.3. The simulation was run using the CAL-R Pearce-Hall Simulator 
(Grikietis, et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 9. The results of the test phase of Experiment 7. The likelihood that outcomes 3 and 4 
would occur for each test compound was rated on a scale from 1-9 with scores below 5 
indicating an expectation that outcome 3 would occur and scores above 5 indicating that 
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outcome 4 would occur. PR and QS were biconditional discrimination cues paired with 
outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. ZN and MO were uncertain cues paired with outcomes 3 and 
4 respectively. Error bars indicate SEM.  
 
Figure 10. The results of the test phase of Experiment 8a and 8b in panels a and b 
respectively. The likelihood that outcomes 3 and 4 would occur for each test compound was 
rated on a scale from 1-9 with scores below 5 indicating an expectation that outcome 3 would 
occur and scores above 5 indicating that outcome 4 would occur. AC and BD were predictive 
cues paired with outcomes 3 and 4 respectively. PR and QS were biconditional 










Table 1. Design of Experiments 1, 2a and 2b and the few condition in Experiment 5. Letters 
denote cues and numbers denote outcomes (attack, retreat, support, surrender). Note that the 
Stage 2 and Test differed between Experiment 1 and Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 (few 
condition). 


































Experiments 2a, 2b and  





















Table 2. Design of Experiment 3. Letters denote cues and numbers denote outcomes (attack, 
retreat, support, surrender). 




























Table 3. Design of Experiments 4a and 4b and the many condition in Experiment 5. Letters 
denote cues and numbers denote outcomes (attack, retreat, support, surrender). Note that 
Stage 2 and Test differed between Experiment 4a and Experiments 4b and 5 (many 
condition). 





































Experiments 4b and  



















Table 4. Design of Experiment 6. Letters denote cues and numbers denote outcomes (attack, 
retreat, support, surrender). 







































Table 5. Design of Experiment 7. Letters denote cues and numbers denote outcomes (attack, 
retreat, support, surrender). 































Table 6. Design of Experiment 8a and 8b. Letters denote cues and numbers denote outcomes 
(attack, retreat, support, surrender). Note that Stage 1 differed between Experiment 8a and 
8b. 
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